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Bounded Institutions  
abstract.  This Essay examines two alternative designs for hierarchical institutions: 
“bounded” and “unbounded.” In a bounded structure, a principal decides on a bounded aggre-
gate numerical allocation, and then an agent makes the allocation to an underlying subject popu-
lation while complying with the bound. In an unbounded structure, the principal provides no 
aggregate numerical cap, but instead provides some other form of guidance to the agent regard-
ing allocation. An example of a bounded institution is grading to a pre-arranged curve (“X stu-
dents receive As”), while an example of an unbounded institution is granting a particular grade 
to each student who meets a particular threshold (“each student who displays mastery of the ma-
terial receives an A”). 
 Bounded and unbounded institutions are common in many legal contexts and differ in 
their strengths and weaknesses. From the principal’s perspective, bounded institutions are in-
creasingly desirable to the extent that (a) there is a homogeneous and large subject population, 
(b) the agent is likely to be biased or to make systematic errors, and (c) it is difficult to devise 
other rules to guide the agent’s decision. If agents are biased but otherwise share preferences 
with the principal—and the principal knows the underlying subject population’s traits—then 
bounded institutions can produce the precise outcome that the principal wants even though nei-
ther the principal nor the agent is fully informed or free of error. 
 The Essay applies these insights to government appropriations, environmental law, and 
administrative law (among other areas). Consider, for example, funding scientific research 
through the National Science Foundation (NSF). Congress should give the NSF a fixed (bound-
ed) budget if it thinks the NSF is biased in favor of funding scientific research and the distribu-
tion of quality of scientific research proposals is relatively predictable from year to year. If the 
NSF always wants to fund the same projects that Congress would, by contrast, then Congress 
should tell the NSF to fund all research projects the NSF deems worthy, thereby giving the NSF 
an unbounded source of funding. 
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To bound or not to bound? While the question is not usually framed this 
way, policymakers face the choice of whether to “bound” in many legal con-
texts. Should Congress give government programs a bounded budget (as in 
discretionary spending) or allow the program budget to be unbounded and 
spent as needed (as in entitlement spending)? Should Congress bound the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) by subjecting its regulations to a “regu-
latory budget,” or should it allow the EPA to enact any regulations that meet a 
specified standard or rule? Should judges be bound in the total lengths of the 
sentences they can give, or should criminal sentences be left to judicial discre-
tion? Should governments be required to award a bounded percentage of con-
tracts to minority-owned businesses, or should the government consider mi-
nority ownership as a factor in awarding contracts without being bound to any 
target? Should the National Science Foundation (NSF) have a bounded budget 
and then award grants to the best projects that conform to the budget, or 
should the NSF choose a quality threshold and award grants to all projects that 
meet it—even if there are more or fewer projects meeting the threshold than 
expected? Should a law school instruct its professors to grade on a bounded 
curve, or should grading be left to the instructor’s discretion? 
In a bounded institutional structure, a policymaking body (the principal) 
places a binding numerical restriction on one or more dimensions of a subordi-
nate body’s (the agent’s) decision process. The existence of the bound compels 
the agent to compare subjects who may or may not benefit from a program in-
stituted by the principal but administered by the agent. Budgets, quotas, and 
curves are prominent examples of bounded institutional structures. In an un-
bounded structure, by contrast, the agent is not compelled to compare subjects 
but rather makes separate determinations about each subject. 
This Essay has two purposes. The first is descriptive: boundedness is recur-
rent in law and policy, and there is particular value in naming the phenomenon 
and applying formal economic tools to explain when and why bounded struc-
tures are more (or less) attractive. The second is normative: numerical bounds 
have many underappreciated practical and theoretical attractions, and they 
might be used more extensively than they are now. 
Before going further, it is important to avoid two possible sources of mis-
understanding. First, bounded does not mean “rigid” in the sense of “con-
strained.” An agent subject to a bound may feel much less constrained than an 
unbounded agent who must apply precise rules articulated by the principal. In-
stead of implying rigidity, boundedness refers to the existence of some aggre-
gate numerical requirement that requires direct comparisons of one subject to 
another. Second, in a world of finite resources, all institutions are bounded to 
some degree. Entitlement spending, for example, cannot be infinite—even if 
  
the yale law journal 124:336   20 14  
340 
 
that is what the programs ostensibly require. But in a bounded institution, the 
numerical restriction compels comparison among subjects relatively quickly, 
while in an unbounded structure, the tradeoffs among subjects may become 
apparent only much later (if they become apparent at all). As a result, I believe 
the bounded-unbounded distinction will prove fruitful even if it is not abso-
lute. 
Bounded and unbounded structures add a new dimension to the volumi-
nous literature on legislative delegation to administrative agencies and other 
branches. This literature has focused on why legislatures delegate.1 A smaller 
literature asks to whom legislatures should delegate—agencies, courts, or some 
other actor.2 Yet another well-developed literature focuses on one aspect of how 
legislatures should delegate: should the principals provide agents with rules or 
standards in constraining the agents’ delegated authority?3 
The focus on bounded versus unbounded institutional structures introduc-
es a new theme to the literature on how legislatures should delegate to courts 
and agencies. Bounded institutional structures impose aggregate numerical re-
strictions on agents and compel agents to make relative determinations among 
subjects.4 Bounds can coexist with rules, standards, or complete discretion on 
other dimensions of the agent’s decision-making process. For example, a grad-
ing curve specifies the number of each type of grade that the professor can 
award and compels the professor to compare students to each other. The curve 
is a bounded institution. But other dimensions of the grading decision may be 
 
1. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, 
and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1036 (2006) (“The ques-
tion, ‘Why do legislators delegate?’ . . . [is] the subject of a rich literature.”); see also JAMES 
M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) (providing the seminal argument that leg-
islators delegate to promote the application of technical expertise to policymaking ques-
tions). For a more recent rational choice model of optimal delegation for technical expertise, 
see Jonathan Bendor & Adam Meirowitz, Spatial Models of Delegation, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
293 (2004). 
2. See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 1 (comparing the benefits and costs of delegating to agen-
cies and/or courts). 
3. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A 
Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 379 (1985). 
4. Many bounds that seem to be placed on an agent’s inputs can be reinterpreted as bounds on 
the agent’s outputs. For example, suppose that Congress reduces the EPA’s number of em-
ployees and that there is a fixed labor input required to issue environmental regulations. 
This nominal bound on the input (employees) functions as a bound on the output (envi-
ronmental regulations). Indeed, defining an agent’s inputs and outputs is difficult. It is un-
clear, for example, if the EPA’s output should be measured by regulations, environmental 





subject to anything from a strict rule to complete discretion. One educational 
institution that uses a curve may provide professors with exam questions and 
grading rules, while another institution that relies on a curve may tell the pro-
fessors nothing about how to assign grades. 
Unbounded institutional structures entail no aggregate numerical cap on 
the agent’s decision; they allow for anything from strict rules to unspecified 
discretion regarding that decision. For example, some entitlement spending 
programs, such as Medicare, obligate the government to “make payments . . . 
to any person who . . . meets the legal criteria for eligibility.”5 Moreover, the 
government is not allowed to become involved in medical decision making.6 By 
contrast, other entitlement programs, such as Social Security, use rules to de-
termine which beneficiaries receive funding and how much each beneficiary re-
ceives. Focusing on bounded and unbounded institutional structures allows us 
to see that, contrary to standard analyses, the question of rules versus stand-
ards does not exhaust the question of how principals can (or should) delegate 
authority to agents. 
When principals must delegate and agents are potentially biased, my dis-
cussion and model, which build upon the optimal delegation literature in eco-
nomics,7 offer several recommendations relating to the use of bounded institu-
tions. Bounded institutional structures work well relative to unbounded 
structures when (1) there is relatively little variation in quality among subjects 
evaluated by the agent (for example, the quality of scientific grant applications 
to the NSF does not vary all that much across different applications); (2) 
agents evaluate a large number of subjects; (3) agents are likely to be biased 
relative to the principal; and (4) a rule that constrains the agent’s behavior is 
impractical (for example, scientific quality is difficult to specify by rule, and a 
rule that attempted to do so would lead to poor funding choices). 
Unbounded institutions, by contrast, outperform bounded institutions 
when subject populations are small and inconsistent. Bounded budgets for 
government departments subject to idiosyncratic needs—such as the Federal 
Emergency Management Administration (FEMA)—are a bad idea. Instead, 
 
5. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 108 (2014) (defining “enti-
tlement”). 
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012) (specifying that “[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed 
to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the 
practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided”). 
7. For a recent contribution to the optimal delegation literature that discusses delegation in the 
presence of multiple subjects, see Alexander Frankel, Aligned Delegation, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 
66 (2014). Frankel provides a helpful review of the optimal delegation literature. Id. at 67-
68. 
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FEMA and similar departments are better off with more flexible unbounded 
budgets that can respond to unexpected needs (such as those created by a cata-
strophic hurricane). In addition, unbounded institutions perform better when 
agents share preferences with the principal. For example, if the NSF demon-
strates expertise in evaluating grant applications and shares Congress’s prefer-
ences over how many projects to fund, then it should be trusted with an un-
bounded budget. The unbounded budget would allow the NSF to respond 
when the number of worthwhile applications is unusually high or low. 
In some circumstances, the optimal delegation literature demonstrates that 
bounded institutional structures can approximate ideal outcomes even though 
neither the principal nor the agent is fully informed or free of bias.8 Suppose, 
for example, that Congress is incapable of evaluating specific scientific pro-
posals but has a general sense of how many scientific research projects are 
worth pursuing each year.9 Further suppose there are a large number of inde-
pendent grant proposals submitted to the NSF each year, but the NSF is biased 
and values science more than Congress does. Left to its own devices with an 
unbounded budget, the NSF would fund more projects than Congress would 
like. But assume the NSF is good at judging proposals in relative terms, and 
the NSF’s comparative evaluation of proposals would be the same as Con-
gress’s. Under these assumptions, Congress should pick a bounded budget for 
the NSF that reflects Congress’s general understanding of the public benefits 
of science. It should then order the NSF to allocate that budget according to 
the NSF’s discretion. This bounded institution allows the right projects to re-
ceive funding—because the NSF is a good evaluator—but prevents the NSF’s 
pro-science bias from producing more projects than Congress wants. The fact 
that bounded institutions can produce ideal outcomes in relatively unpromis-
ing situations (with inexpert principals and biased agents) demonstrates that 
bounded institutions are a promising institutional structure in many cases. 
The Essay is organized as follows. Part I provides more detail on the dis-
tinction between bounded and unbounded institutions. Part II examines the 
strengths and weaknesses of each type of institutional structure under different 
conditions. Part III applies the insights of Part II to EPA regulation, govern-
ment spending policy, the use of quotas to prevent racial or gender bias, and 
judicial sentencing disparities. Part IV concludes by arguing that the virtues of 
bounded institutions may be underappreciated and that bounded institutions 
themselves may be underused. The Appendix explores a formal economic 
 
8. See, e.g., Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, Comparative Cheap Talk, 132 J. ECON. 
THEORY 70 (2007). 





model of bounded and unbounded institutions, and derives the results de-
scribed in Part II. 
i .  bounded and unbounded institutions 
Let me offer a brief word on how the argument will proceed: I typically 
begin with an abstract and formal description of the “problem” and then pro-
vide more concrete examples to illustrate the abstract principles. 
A. Defining Bounded and Unbounded Institutions 
1. Principals, Agents, and Bounded Institutions 
This Essay examines hierarchical institutions in which a superior body (the 
principal) sets policy and a subordinate body (the agent) implements (or allo-
cates) that policy.10 The policy choices are made with reference to subjects, who 
are affected by both the principal’s and the agent’s decisions. The subjects dif-
fer in quality (for example, academic achievement in the grades context). The 
principal wants allocations to be a function of subject quality. For example, 
students who demonstrate better achievement should get better grades. The 
quality of the subjects is observed by the agent, but cannot be verified by the 
principal. 
With respect to funding for scientific research, Congress (the principal) 
wants to fund scientific research (the policy) and assigns implementation of 
this policy to the NSF (the agent). The subjects of the NSF’s decisions are sci-
entific research grant proposals, which differ in quality—roughly defined as the 
prospective gain in knowledge per dollar associated with each proposal. Con-
gress wants to fund the highest-quality grant proposals. The NSF observes the 
prospective gain in knowledge per dollar associated with each proposal, but 
Congress cannot verify this information. Congress may lack the expertise to 
understand scientific quality, or scientific quality may have so many dimen-
sions that it cannot be easily verified by anyone besides the agent. 
The principal knows the distribution of subject quality within the popula-
tion11 but cannot determine any individual subject’s quality. Instead, the prin-
cipal relies on one or more agents to observe and determine subjects’ quality 
 
10. While this Essay focuses primarily on public institutions, bounded and unbounded institu-
tional structures exist in both public and private settings. In fact, most principal-agent rela-
tionships can be characterized as bounded or unbounded. 
11. In reality, the principal does not know the probability distribution of quality. Some uncer-
tainty regarding the distribution of quality is inevitable. 
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and allocate benefits accordingly.12 However, in observing subject quality, an 
agent may have some “bias” relative to the principal. Bias means that the agent 
systematically perceives subjects as having higher or lower quality than the 
principal would perceive, were the principal able to observe subject quality di-
rectly.13 
In the scientific research funding context, Congress has a sense, from prior 
years of funding scientific research, of the quality of the typical grant proposal, 
as well as how the quality differs from proposal to proposal. But Congress is 
unable to evaluate the quality of individual scientific proposals. Instead, Con-
gress must rely on the NSF, an agency with expertise in judging the merits of 
these projects. The NSF’s expertise enables it to make an informed judgment 
about each grant proposal’s quality. The NSF shares Congress’s goal of fund-
ing the research proposals that will produce the most knowledge per dollar.14 
But the NSF may not share Congress’s opinion about the quality of any given 
proposal. For example, if the NSF thinks the benefits of science are greater 
than Congress does (or if the NSF thinks the costs of funding are lower than 
Congress believes), then the NSF is “biased” in its evaluation of grant pro-
posals. 
After observing subjects’ quality, the agent determines the policy allocation. 
The principal may choose to impose or refrain from imposing a bound on the 
agent’s allocation decisions. A bound is a numerical limitation on some dimen-
sion of the agent’s policy allocation to subjects. When the principal imposes a 
bound, the agent allocates X to the subjects based on the agent’s observation of 
the subjects’ quality and the bound’s restriction; this process requires compar-
ing subjects.15 If there is no bound, then the agent allocates to the subjects 
 
12. Agents may or may not know the overall distribution of subject quality. 
13. For the seminal model of uninformed principals who delegate decisions to agents who may 
be biased, see Bengt Hölmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 
(1979). 
14. Alexander Frankel calls this assumption “increasing differences.” Frankel, supra note 7, at 67 
n.3. 
15. For a more formal definition of something similar to what I am calling a bounded institu-
tion, see Frankel, supra note 7, at 75. There, Frankel defines a Φ-moment mechanism. Such 
mechanisms are numerical limits imposed by principals on different “moments” of the 
agent’s policy allocation. A first-moment mechanism imposes a mean value on the agent’s 
allocation (without other constraint). Id. A second-moment mechanism constrains both the 
mean and the sum of squared deviations from the mean of the policy allocation to subjects. 
Id. A ∞-moment mechanism constrains the agent’s allocation completely, requiring the 
agent to rank the subjects and specifying the allocation to each subject by rank. Id. Note that 
all of these Φ-moment mechanisms require the agent to pay attention to the relative values 
of each subject’s quality, as well as the absolute values. In the text, I will focus on first-order 






based on the agent’s observations, but the agent is not compelled to compare 
subjects directly to one another. 
With respect to the NSF, the “policy allocation” consists of the founda-
tion’s grant-making decisions. To make funding decisions, the NSF uses its 
observation of each grant application’s scientific merit. If the NSF has no ex-
plicit budget, then it chooses to fund all scientific projects that it believes are 
worth funding. Congress subsequently provides the money for all grant appli-
cations approved by the NSF. Alternatively, Congress could provide the NSF 
with a limited budget for funding grant applications.16 If Congress imposes a 
bounded budget, then the NSF must stick to that budget; it will fund the high-
est-quality grant applications until the budget is filled. The bounded budget 
compels the NSF to compare the quality of one proposal directly to that of an-
other, rather than comparing the quality of each proposal to an absolute stand-
ard. If the NSF (when subject to a budget) refuses to compare quality across 
applications, then it violates its (and Congress’s) goal of providing the most 
knowledge per dollar.  
The principal dislikes errors. An error occurs when a subject is allocated 
more or less than the principal thinks the subject should be allocated. To avoid 
such errors, the principal decides whether to constrain the agent’s decision pro-
cess by imposing a bound, which can reduce allocation errors. 
In the context of scientific funding, an error occurs when a grant proposal 
that has a desirable “knowledge per dollar” value (from Congress’s perspective) 
fails to get funding, or when a grant proposal that has negative knowledge per 
dollar value (from Congress’s perspective) is awarded funding. Congress will 
bound the NSF’s research budget if it expects less costly funding errors with a 
bounded NSF budget than with an unbounded one. 
Table 1 provides a sketch of how this abstract framework applies in non-
NSF contexts.   
 
as rank ordering by the agent and a specified action for each rank in the ordering, that could 
also be chosen by the principal. 
16. A budget corresponds to a first-order moment mechanism, see Frankel, supra note 7, at 75, 
constraining the NSF’s provision of dollars to grant applicants. There are other more com-
plicated bounds that Congress could impose on the NSF. For example, Congress could spec-
ify that the NSF’s scoring mechanism for grant applications have a particular average and 
standard deviation, and then state the point at which the NSF should cut off grants. This 
would correspond (in Frankel’s terminology) to a second-order moment mechanism. Id. 
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2. Simplifying Assumptions 
To make the analysis tractable, I make several unrealistic assumptions that 
allow me to focus on the tradeoffs between bounded and unbounded institu-
tions. I do not mean to imply that the considerations addressed below are un-
important. Instead, I leave their analysis to other papers, past and future. 
 
17.  460 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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a. Two-Tiered Institutions 
This Essay focuses on two-tiered institutions with a policymaking principal 
and an implementing agent who makes decisions about subjects based on the 
agent’s perception of the subjects’ quality. In reality, hierarchical institutions 
have multiple tiers.18 The choice between bounded and unbounded institutions 
explored here therefore exists at many levels. In a three-tiered institution, the 
top-level body may set an unbounded standard for the second-level body, 
while the second-level body may impose a bounded constraint on the third tier. 
The top level may also insist that a bounded constraint be applied to the third 
tier. In each case, the costs and benefits discussed here should govern the 
choice between unbounded and bounded institutions at any level of a hierar-
chy.19 
To illustrate this point: when I examine the relationship between Congress 
and the NSF, I assume that Congress is a single agent with well-defined pref-
erences, ignoring the fact that Congress is an agent for the American people 
and that Congress may not have well-defined preferences. I also assume that 
the NSF is a single agent or group of agents, ignoring the NSF’s internal hier-
archy.  
b. Sharing of Relative Quality Perceptions 
While the agent may be biased—in the sense that the agent and principal 
have different perceptions of subject quality—I assume that the principal and 
the agent’s quality determinations are related in an important way. If the agent 
were asked to rank the subjects by quality, the agent would give the same “rela-
tive” ranking as the principal. In other words, the agent may be biased in the 
sense of having a higher or lower observation of the subjects’ absolute quality. 
But, if asked to make relative determinations, then the agent and the principal 
would produce the same rank ordering and identify the same quality “distance” 
between subjects.20 
 
18. Two-tiered institutions are the standard institutional structure of study in the optimal dele-
gation literature in economics. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 7, at 66 (developing a model 
with “a” principal and “an” agent). 
19. The Essay ignores any interaction effects between bounded and unbounded structures at 
different tiers in the hierarchy. 
20. Frankel makes a less restrictive but related assumption about agent preferences called “rich-
ness” that is similar to the relative quality preferences described here. Frankel’s assumption 
restricts the agents’ preferences enough so that the principal can create a structure in which 
the agent will assign subjects to the structure in the same way that the principal would. See 





To illustrate the relative quality assumption in the context of grading, a 
professor may give a student an 80 out of 100 while the dean would assign a 90 
out of 100, but if the professor were to grade the students in a class, the profes-
sor’s grades for each student on a scale of 100 would always be ten points lower 
than the dean’s. The professor’s grading tendencies can be “generous” (grades 
are systematically too high) or “stingy” (grades are systematically too low), but 
the relative quality assumption means that the dean and professor share a rank 
ordering of the students, as well as an identical sense of how far one student’s 
performance is from another’s. In the context of funding for scientific research, 
the NSF may have a consistently higher or lower opinion of the benefits of sci-
entific research than Congress does, but the NSF agrees with Congress on 
which projects are more meritorious than others, and by how much. 
By assuming that principals and agents share rank-order assessments of 
quality, I assume that the agent’s observations provide valuable information to 
the principal about the subject, even if the principal does not necessarily agree 
with the agent’s judgments. By contrast, if there is no relationship between the 
principal’s and agent’s rank-order assessments, then the principal may not 
want to rely on the agent to perform any allocation, since the agent’s allocation 
will share nothing with the principal’s. (In this case, the principal may as well 
allocate to subjects at random and save the cost of paying for the agent.) 
c. No Strategic Behavior 
I assume that the introduction of a bounded or unbounded restriction on 
agent behavior does not change the behavior of the subjects.21 Therefore, a 
curve does not cause students to work harder even though they are competing 
against their classmates. While such strategic behavior is undoubtedly present, 
it is the subject of a long literature.22 In order to focus on the role of princi-
pal/agent problems in the choice between bounded and unbounded institu-
tions, I assume that these undoubtedly important interactions do not play a 
role. 
d. Random Assignment of Subjects to Agents 
In cases in which the principal relies on many agents to evaluate subjects, I 
assume that each agent gets a random sample of the subject population to eval-
 
21. Frankel makes the same assumption. Frankel, supra note 7, at 81 n.21. 
22. See, e.g., Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor 
Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841 (1981) (analyzing compensation schemes that base workers’ 
pay on their rank within an organization). 
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uate. This assumption excludes, for example, the possibility that students of 
low quality choose professors who are known to be easy graders. This assump-
tion means that the analysis developed below is most applicable to situations 
such as assigned classes. 
e. Optimal Agent Response to Bounds 
I assume that when the bound constrains the agent, the agent responds in a 
way that is best for the agent. For example, suppose that the NSF, left to its 
own devices, would like to award $2 billion in funding for research but that 
Congress has only appropriated $1 billion. In response, the NSF will choose to 
fund the $1 billion in projects that it thinks will produce the most valuable sci-
entific knowledge. This assumption means that the agent does not change its 
preferences because of the bounds. For example, the NSF does not fund poorly 
conceived projects instead of well-conceived projects because it is angry about 
its limited budget. 
f. Principal Knows the Distribution of Subject Quality 
Unless stated otherwise, I assume that the principal knows the distribution 
of subject quality even though the principal cannot observe the quality of any 
specific subject. This assumption means that even though the principal cannot 
get involved in determining any subject’s quality, the principal has a sense of 
the average subject quality and the variability of quality across subjects. In the 
NSF context, Congress knows the average quality, and the variability of the 
quality, of the scientific research grant applications that the NSF receives. 
B. The Scope of Bounded and Unbounded Institutional Structures 
1. Bounded Institutional Structures and Rules and Standards 
With bounded and unbounded institutions defined, we can now precisely 
describe the difference between bounds and rules. When using rules, principals 
specify ex ante how agents should allocate to subjects based on “factual” char-
acteristics.23 While the principal would ideally like to specify rules based on 
quality, quality is unobservable to the principal.24 Instead, the principal speci-
 
23. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 3, at 559-60 (stating that “a rule may entail an advance deter-
mination of what conduct is permissible, leaving only factual issues for the adjudicator”). 
24. If we apply this framework to making traffic law, the principal is the legislature, which 






fies the agent’s action as a function of some other characteristic that is observa-
ble, verifiable, and imperfectly correlated with subject quality. 
A rule prescribes the agent’s action as a function of a characteristic of the 
subject’s quality. The rule does not ordinarily prescribe the agent’s action with 
respect to one subject as a function of the characteristic of another subject. 
Consider speed limits, a paradigmatic example of a rule.25 Driving speed is a 
characteristic that is correlated with “driving quality,” measured by the risk of 
harm to others that results from one’s driving. With a speed limit, a principal 
tells police officers how to allocate speeding tickets as a function of a subject’s 
driving speed. With a speed limit rule, the driving speed or riskiness of other 
drivers is not relevant. If the driver goes over the prescribed speed, then the 
rule specifies that the driver should be sanctioned, regardless of the behavior of 
other drivers. With a bound, by contrast, the principal specifies an aggregate 
limit that is not explicitly a function of any characteristic. Because the bound is 
an aggregate numerical limit that applies to all of the agent’s actions, the bound 
requires the agent to compare subjects to each other. After all, the allocation an 
agent makes to one subject has an effect on what is available to allocate to the 
other subjects. This would not be the case with a rule.26 
Bounds and rules are similar in the sense that both are solutions to the 
problem of how a principal should optimally delegate to an agent. In addition, 
one of the primary costs of both bounds and rules is a reduction in agent flexi-
bility. But these similarities should not obscure the core idea that bounds and 
rules constitute two different solutions to the problem of optimal delegation. 
Not surprisingly, a bound can coexist with a rule, a standard, or complete 
agent discretion. An unbounded structure can also coexist with a rule. To illus-
trate the relationship between bounded and unbounded institutional structures 
 
likelihood that the way a subject is driving will lead to an accident. It is impossible for the 
principal to observe “quality,” or to verify it to a court and/or the principal. There is another 
characteristic, driving speed, that is imperfectly correlated with driving quality and is ob-
servable. The principal can specify a rule based on speed—a speed limit—but cannot specify 
agent actions as a function of overall driving quality. 
25. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 3, at 559-60 (illustrating a rule with the example of speed lim-
its).  
26. One could imagine rules that command comparisons between subjects. For example, we 
could imagine a rule that says, “Give tickets to the fastest ten drivers, no more or less.” The 
costs and benefits of this rule, however, would be different from the costs and benefits of 
the rules traditionally described in the literature. For a model that focuses on the strategic 
interactions that result from comparisons among subjects, see Margaret H. Lemos & Alex 
Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 MINN. L. REV. 9 (2011). 
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and the conventional divide between rules and standards, Table 2 presents a 
matrix.27 
Table 2 demonstrates that principals can bind agents to limit an allocation 
while still allowing agents considerable discretion along other dimensions. 
Grading according to a curve provides a familiar example: while many schools 
specify grading curves, they seldom specify how the professor should grade an 
exam. Instead, the professor is free to grade as desired, so long as the distribu-
tion of grades adheres to the curve. The principal dictates the distribution of 
grades but gives little or no guidance on how to assign them. 
Numerical bounds also can be combined with rules.28 The House of Repre-
sentatives has 435 seats, and these seats are apportioned to states based on pop-
ulation.29 In this case, the principal provides a bound on the total number of 
seats in the House of Representatives (435) and a rule regarding how to allocate 
them (states with higher populations get more representatives according to a 
formula).30 If Congress decided to increase or decrease the number of repre-
sentatives, then the allocation rule could easily be altered accordingly. 
Unbounded institutions can also be combined with rules or discretion. In 
the speeding example, an unbounded rule might say, “Give tickets to any driv-
er going over eighty miles per hour.” The number of tickets issued by the agent 
(“how many”) is determined by the number of drivers violating the eighty mile 
per hour rule. An unbounded discretionary standard, by contrast, exists when 
the agent faces no clear rule for determining either “how many” or “to whom.” 
If the principal tells the subordinate to “give tickets to those driving recklessly,” 
then this is an unbounded standard. 
 
27. Both rules/standards and bounded/unbounded institutions vary continuously rather than 
dichotomously. For example, a bound can be one-dimensional (e.g, a floor or a cap). The 
matrix in Table 2 is for illustrative purposes only. A more accurate table would have a con-
tinuum along both dimensions. 
28. When superior bodies combine rules with bounds and the rules (and applications of the 
rules) conflict with application of the bounds, the superior body must provide a conflict res-
olution mechanism. If a principal issues rules for determining who should receive a speed-
ing ticket—for example, anyone going over eighty miles per hour—and also binds the  
subordinate to issue a precise number of tickets (N), then the principal must specify what 
happens if the number of drivers going over eighty miles per hour is different from N. If the 
rule yields to the bound and n tickets are issued even if there are not n drivers going over 
eighty miles per hour, then the rule regarding “who” is less rule-like than it might initially 
appear. 
29. See ROYCE CROCKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41382, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
APPORTIONMENT FORMULA: AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
STATES (2010). 





2. Does the Typical Institution Have a Bounded or Unbounded Structure? 
The default institutional structure is both bounded and unbounded. If the 
principal does not impose a numerical limit on the agent’s behavior, then the 
agent is formally unbounded. Nonetheless, any resource constraint on an agent 
functions as a bound. If the agent cannot simply increase his or her resources 
unilaterally, then the agent’s allocation is limited by this resource limitation. 
For example, an administrative agency cannot promulgate an infinite number 
of rules if it has limited resources. Nevertheless, this implicit resource con-
straint presents a very different limitation on agent behavior than a more spe-
cific bound. An agency with few resources and unbounded rulemaking authori-
ty may make very different rules than an agency with greater resources and 
strict bounds (such as a regulatory budget) on its rulemaking authority. 
As the preceding paragraph indicates, hybrid unbounded/bounded institu-
tions can exist. Lower-level bodies can face bounded constraints along some 
dimensions and unbounded constraints along others. In addition, lower-level 
bodies can face directions that combine elements of bounded and unbounded 
instructions along the same dimension. Again, grading proves illustrative. 
Grading curves are often not precisely bounded. Instead of prescribing an irre-
versible number or percentage for each grade, curves often prescribe a range. 
At the top of the curve, for example, professors may be allowed to give 2% to 
5% of the class a grade of A+. Within this narrow range, the professor’s ability 
to award an A+ is unbounded. Another possibility is an asymmetric bound; the 
professor can award an A+ to no more than 5% of the class, but the professor 
can give as few as zero A+ grades. Hybrid institutions such as the grading sys-
tems described here will have some of the costs and benefits of both bounded 
and unbounded institutions. For simplicity, however, this Essay focuses on the 
extremes—numerically bounded and unbounded institutions. 
  
  




rules, standards, bounded and unbounded institutions 
 




Grading: Give 10% As. De-
scribe how to grade by rule—
for example, give points for 
specific answers. 
Grading: Give 10% As. Choose 
As based on excellence. 
 
Regulations: Regulatory 
budget. Choose regulations 




Regulations: Regulatory  
budget. Choose regulations 
based on appropriateness. 
Criminal: Give N tickets in a 
certain period. Give tickets to 
n drivers going the highest 
speed. 
Criminal: Give X tickets to 
those driving most  
dangerously. 
Representation in the House of 
Representatives: 435 seats.  
Allocate according to a specif-
ic function based on a state’s 
population. 
Representation in the House of 
Representatives: 435 seats.  
Represent diverse interests/the 
entire population. 
Spending: Budget of $X. 
Spend on all those over age Y. 
Spending: Budget of $X. Spend 
on all those who need it. 
Unbounded 
Grading: Give As to all who 
score 90% or above on the 
final exam with points  
specified by detailed grading 
instructions. 
Grading: Give As to whoever 
demonstrates excellence. 
Regulations: Strict cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA). 
 
Regulations: Pure discretionary 
regulation. 
Criminal: Give tickets to  
anyone going over eighty 
miles per hour. 
Criminal: Give tickets to those 
driving recklessly. 
Representation: One  
representative for every X  
population. 
Representation: Represent  
diverse interests/the entire 
population. 
Spending: Spend any amount 
of money on all those over age 
Y. 
Spending: Spend on all those 
who need it. 
 i i .  bounded versus unbounded institutional structures 
With the principal’s choice between bounded and unbounded institutional 
structures now defined, this Part analyzes circumstances favoring the use of 





costs, making them undesirable for the principal. Under other conditions, 
bounds decrease the cost of policy allocation errors. In the Appendix, I present 
an economic model that derives many of the results that I describe here. 
A. Unbiased Agents 
Assume, for purposes of this section, that the agent receives a perfect signal 
about the subjects’ quality. In addition, the agent is unbiased. (By which I 
mean, again, that the agent shares the principal’s rank-order preferences re-
garding allocation.) 
Under these circumstances, unbounded institutional structures are prefera-
ble to bounded structures.31 Unbounded institutional structures always pro-
duce the principal’s preferred outcome because the agent observes each subject 
and shares the principal’s preferences. As a result, the agent produces the allo-
cation that the principal would have produced if the principal could observe 
each subject’s quality. There is no reason to constrain such an agent with a 
bound. 
By contrast, under these same conditions, bounded institutional structures 
make errors inevitable. Instead of allowing the unbiased agent to make choices 
that would be identical to the principal’s, the bound constrains the agent to 
make different choices.  
The superiority of unbounded institutions in the context of unbiased 
agents can be illustrated using environmental protection regulations. Suppose 
the EPA chooses regulations exactly as Congress would want it to. In this case, 
a regulatory budget is harmful. Without a regulatory budget, the EPA chooses 
Congress’s preferred regulations. With a budget, by contrast, some regulations 
may be precluded. In any year, there may be more or fewer efficient and new 
environmental regulations than there would be in a typical year. However, the 
problems of a bounded curve are reduced when the population of possible reg-
ulations is stable, because the chance that a year will have an atypically strong 
or weak set of regulations is lower. 
B. Biased Agents 
Now assume that the agent makes biased determinations of subject quality. 
In other words, the agent systematically overestimates or underestimates the 
desirability of a particular allocation relative to the principal. 
 
31. For a proof of this, see infra Appendix Part B. 
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1. Benefits and Costs of Bounded and Unbounded Institutional Structures 
a. Theory 
For bounded structures, the principal chooses the budget for a particular 
agent based on the true population mean and the number of subjects that are 
evaluated by the agent. Because of the bound, the agent no longer chooses allo-
cations for each subject based solely on the agent’s bias.32 Instead, the agent 
chooses allocations based on the relative quality of each subject and the bound 
that the agent must meet with respect to all subjects. Therefore, a bound ad-
justs for bias: an agent who is downwardly biased in determining quality rela-
tive to the principal will be forced to raise her allocation as a function of quality 
while an agent who is upwardly biased will be compelled to lower her average 
quality allocation. Establishing the bound, however, introduces some of the 
costs described in the previous Part. The agent must comply with the bound—
and if the bound is poorly chosen for the group of subjects, then the allocation 
chosen by the agent may be bad for the principal. For example, the sample of 
subjects that comes before the agent may differ from the population distribu-
tion. In this case, the bound may require over- or under-allocation, regardless 
of the agent’s bias. 
If the principal knows that the agent is biased in a particular direction, then 
unidirectional bounds may be appropriate. For example, if the agent is likely to 
be upwardly biased, then a cap (without a floor) becomes desirable for the 
principal. The cap constrains the agent’s upward bias, while the lack of a floor 
means that, if subject quality happens to be unusually weak, then the agent can 
allocate accordingly. 
b. Application to the National Science Foundation  
Consider Congress’s choice of whether to impose a grant-making budget 
on the NSF (the current practice) or to allow the NSF to fund all projects that 
the NSF thinks are worth funding. Suppose further that the NSF is biased: it 
places a higher value on scientific research than Congress does. If Congress 
chooses a bounded institutional structure for the NSF, it budgets a certain 
amount for funding research and then charges the NSF with allocating those 
funds to different grant applications (subjects). If Congress chooses an un-
bounded structure for the NSF, then it allows the NSF to provide grants to any 
scientific projects that the NSF deems worthy. 
 





Both bounded and unbounded structures offer advantages and disad-
vantages to Congress. If Congress imposes a bounded grant-making budget on 
the NSF, then the misallocation caused by the NSF diminishes (or is even 
eliminated). The grant-making budget prevents the NSF from indulging its 
pro-science bias and forces the NSF to make funding decisions based on the 
budget and the relative merits of the grant applications forwarded by scientists. 
On the other hand, if the grant applications that come before the NSF prove to 
be systematically better or worse than Congress expected when it formulated 
the budget, then requiring the NSF to stick to the budget may result in fund-
ing too few or too many grant applications (from Congress’s perspective). 
If Congress allows the NSF to provide whatever funding the NSF deems 
appropriate, then the NSF can indulge its pro-science bias. The NSF will fund 
more grant applications than Congress would like. Without a budget, funding 
one project does not reduce funding for any other projects. Although Congress 
loses control over NSF bias if it uses an unbounded funding structure, it gains 
flexibility. If the quality of grant applications is much higher than Congress 
expected, the unbounded NSF can respond instantly and fund more projects. 
When choosing between a bounded (discretionary) budget allocation for 
the NSF and an unbounded (entitlement) budget structure, Congress should 
weigh the benefits and costs of each institutional structure. 
2. Factors Favoring the Choice of a Bounded Institutional Structure 
a. Theory 
The principal should choose a bound when the benefits of bias correction 
exceed the costs of rigidity and potential misallocation. The bound is most at-
tractive to the principal when the agent’s bias is high,33 the variability of quality 
within the population is low,34 and the agent faces a large sample of subjects.35 
These factors either increase the benefits of bias reduction or decrease the costs 
of the rigidity imposed by a bound. 
As the number of subjects gets very large, a bounded institutional structure 
produces a perfect allocation in spite of the agent’s bias.36 With a large number 
 
33. See infra Appendix Part C.4. 
34. See infra Appendix Part C.4. 
35. See infra Appendix Part C.4. 
36. See infra Appendix Part C.5. For a related proof, see Frankel, supra note 7, at 73-74 exs. 1-2. 
Frankel offers a discussion of the comparative effectiveness of budgets versus fixed rankings 
for various types of subject distributions. Recall, however, that Frankel is comparing differ-
ent bounded mechanisms while the example here compares bounded structures with un-
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of subjects, the distribution of quality within the agent’s sample population be-
comes indistinguishable from the total population distribution. When the 
bound accurately captures the distribution of the subjects—and we are assum-
ing that the principal has perfect knowledge of the distribution of quality in the 
population—the rigidity costs of the bound become negligible. The bound’s 
bias correction benefits remain robust as the number of subjects gets larger, 
since the agent’s bias does not decline as the number of subjects increases; in-
deed, the bound eliminates the misallocation associated with bias. Moreover, 
because bias is the only source of agent error—recall that the agent would rank 
subjects the same way as the principal—the bound produces the best allocation 
from the principal’s perspective. 
b. Application to the National Science Foundation 
A bounded budget produces rigidity that the NSF cannot undo. The NSF’s 
funding for science must be equal to the appropriated amount. This rigidity is 
good for reducing the impact of NSF bias, but the rigidity is bad for respond-
ing to unexpected shifts in the quality of science research from year to year. 
When the NSF is highly biased—its “pro-science” leanings relative to Con-
gress are significant—then a budget becomes more attractive. Left to its own 
devices, a highly biased NSF will fund much more scientific research than 
Congress would prefer. A budget prevents such overfunding. 
When the quality of scientific grant applications is highly variable, a 
bounded NSF budget becomes less attractive to Congress. High variation in 
quality from grant application to grant application makes Congress’s budget 
riskier. If there happens to be a year in which the quality of projects is surpris-
ingly low, then forcing the NSF to fund a budgeted amount of research leads to 
overfunding. In contrast, allowing the NSF to choose funding based on its own 
perceptions of each project permits funding for scientific research to adjust to 
the highly variable nature of scientific inquiry. Note that different areas of sci-
entific inquiry may have different degrees of variation in quality. As a result, 
Congress may want to impose budgets for some areas of research (where Con-
gress can be confident about quality), but not impose budgets for subjects of 
research that experience more fluctuation in quality from year to year.  
When there are many grant applications to the NSF each year, imposing a 
budget on the NSF becomes more attractive to Congress. To see this, compare 
particle physics research with biological research. Particle physics research of-
 
bounded structures. Frankel’s assumption that the principal wants to minimize the worst-






ten requires spectacularly expensive equipment.37 As a result, there are relative-
ly few applications for funding for particle physics research equipment. In-
stead, scientific organizations make occasional decisions about whether to fund 
multi-billion dollar projects. In these circumstances, a budget for particle phys-
ics research makes little sense. A particle accelerator should either be built or 
not built, and Congress cannot rely on competition for funding among particle 
physicists to constrain the NSF. 
In biology, by contrast, research apparatuses are often much less expen-
sive.38 Instead of relying on one primary accelerator, biological research ad-
vances in hundreds or thousands of labs throughout the country, each of which 
can make independent requests for equipment. As a result, a budget for re-
search in biology is more attractive than a fixed budget for particle physics. 
With a fixed budget for thousands of applications, Congress can force the NSF 
to make direct comparisons among many “desirable” subjects that the NSF, if 
left to its own devices, would have preferred to fund. This constrains the NSF’s 
possible pro-science bias. Relatedly, the availability of many different projects 
makes the typical quality of the proposals easier for Congress to predict, as the 
law of large numbers applies more precisely to a larger sample.39 
3. Perfect Outcomes with Imperfect Principals and Agents 
a. Theory  
With many subjects, a bound produces the principal’s ideal allocation of re-
sources to subjects even if the principal does not know the size or direction of 
the agent’s bias.40 With many subjects, the rigidity imposed by a bound be-
comes less costly. The law of large numbers means that the quality of the sub-
jects “evens out,” enabling the principal to make a very good prediction about 
 
37. For example, according to some estimates, the Large Hadron Collider cost $8 billion,  
see Dennis Overbye, A Giant Takes On Physics’ Biggest Questions, N.Y. TIMES, May  
15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/science/15cern.html [http://perma.cc/83Y6 
-NC6Q], but has produced the best evidence yet for the existence of the Higgs boson, a cen-
tral element of theory in particle physics that had gone unproven for decades. 
38. Research on the human genome, for example, has benefited from the fact that the cost of 
sequencing one base pair of DNA had fallen from $10 to $0.001 by 2005. See BD. ON LIFE 
SCIS., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EN-
ERGY’S GENOMICS: GTL PROGRAM 11 (2006). 
39. See FREDERICK GRAVETTER & LORI-ANN FORZANO, RESEARCH METHODS FOR THE BEHAVIOR-
AL SCIENCES 141 (2011). 
40. For a proof of this assertion, see infra Appendix Part C.5. For an analogous result from the 
“cheap talk” literature in economics, see Chakraborty & Harbaugh, supra note 8. 
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the right amount of funding. With a good prediction, a budget produces less 
rigidity. 
While the rigidity problem of a bounded budget becomes insignificant as 
the number of subjects grows very large, the bias-reducing benefits of a 
bounded budget do not decrease with the number of subjects. As long as the 
principal and agent share a rank ordering, the bound compels the agent to ad-
just the allocation in proportion to the size of the agent’s bias.  
With many subjects, a bounded institutional structure thus leverages the 
information associated with many different observations to minimize rigidity 
while eliminating bias. As a result, bounded structures can obtain perfect out-
comes for the principal. 
b. Application to the National Science Foundation 
When Congress knows the average quality of scientific projects—and when 
there are many such projects—Congress can use a budget to get its ideal 
amount of funding for science, even if the NSF is biased in favor of science 
funding. Why do we get the right amount of science funding even though the 
NSF is biased in favor of science and Congress is incapable of judging individ-
ual scientific proposals? With many scientific proposals, Congress can be con-
fident that it knows the average quality of the proposals, even if it cannot judge 
the quality of any particular proposal. Consequently, Congress will produce a 
budget that gets the total amount of funding correct. The budget constrains 
the NSF: instead of funding all the projects that it wants to, the NSF has to 
confine funding to the amount that Congress determines. Therefore, the NSF’s 
bias cannot be expressed in policy. But because the NSF is still a good judge of 
relative merit, it will allocate its budget to the scientific projects that Congress 
would have picked had Congress been able to judge merit. 
C. Error-Prone Agents Without Bias 
1. Theory 
Instead of being systematically biased relative to the principal, an agent 
may make mistakes of another kind: the agent wants to implement the princi-
pal’s wishes—without bias—but makes mistakes. In other words, the agent is a 
“noisy” but unbiased representative of the principal’s wishes. 
I focus on systematic mistakes—mistakes that the agent repeats with all 
subjects. From an ex ante perspective, the agent is not biased: the agent’s aver-
age mistake relative to the principal’s wishes is zero. Sometimes the agent errs 





pessimistic about quality. On average, the agent is neither consistently optimis-
tic nor consistently pessimistic. But from an ex post perspective, unbiased 
agents making systematic mistakes appear much like biased agents. They make 
the same mistake with respect to each subject, just as a biased agent does. In 
the next period, the agent may make the opposite mistake, but in this period 
the agent is consistently optimistic or pessimistic relative to the principal. 
Principals should prefer bounded structures relative to unbounded struc-
tures when agents make large systematic errors. The larger the agent’s system-
atic error, the more the agent’s final allocation will deviate from the principal’s 
ideal. Because bounded structures limit the scope for agent deviation, they are 
relatively more appealing when the agent’s deviations are large. 
Principals should also prefer bounded structures when agents make sys-
tematic errors and the quality of subject populations does not vary widely. 
With less quality variation, the rigidity introduced by the bound imposes fewer 
costs because the budget instituted by the principal is more likely to be accu-
rate. 
For similar reasons, principals should prefer bounded structures when er-
ror-prone agents allocate to more subjects. With more subjects, the law of large 
numbers means that the bound is more likely to be accurate and that there are 
lower rigidity costs associated with the bound. 
Thus, with a sufficiently large number of subjects for each error-prone 
agent, a bounded structure achieves an ideal outcome for the principal. As the 
number of subjects gets large enough, a budget becomes increasingly accurate 
as variation from subject to subject “averages out.” Consequently, the bound’s 
rigidity costs grow small, while the bound’s benefits in terms of reducing the 
costs of the agent’s repeated errors remain constant. As a result, a bounded 
budget produces an outcome approaching perfection (from the principal’s per-
spective). 
2. Application to the National Science Foundation 
Suppose that the NSF is not biased in favor of science relative to Congress. 
Instead, the NSF makes mistakes. In some years, the NSF consistently overes-
timates the quality of grant applications, while in other years the NSF consist-
ently underestimates the quality of grant applications. This situation might 
arise if the NSF aims to be a truthful agent of Congress but is subject to “fads” 
in science. Sometimes the fad is to be overoptimistic about the utility of a line 
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of inquiry in science; other times the fad unnecessarily denigrates the quality of 
a line of research.41 
By using a budget for certain areas of science, rather than allowing the NSF 
to fund whatever the NSF thinks worthwhile, Congress can reduce the impact 
of scientific fads. The budget ensures that a faddish area does not receive excess 
funding in spite of the NSF’s attraction to the fad. Conversely, a budget for 
“areas of science” ensures that research in unpopular areas is not punished 
simply because it is “out of fashion” from the viewpoint of an NSF that lacks 
the appropriate perspective. 
Congress should therefore be more inclined to give the NSF a budget for 
particular fields of science when there are more grant applications per area, 
when the NSF is more subject to fads, and when a particular scientific field ex-
periences less variation in grant application quality. 
D. Principals with Imperfect Population Information and Agents with Different 
Preferences 
The previous sections assumed that the principal possessed perfect infor-
mation about the distribution of quality within the population. There was 
risk—the principal did not know the quality of any particular subject or group 
of subjects—but there was no uncertainty: the principal knew the distribution 
of quality. This assumption is unrealistic. Not only is the principal typically 
unable to observe any individual subject’s traits, but the principal is also un-
likely to know precisely what the average value of quality is, or how quality 
varies from subject to subject within the population. 
More generally, when the principal has more uncertainty regarding the dis-
tribution of quality within the population, bounded institutions become less 
attractive relative to unbounded institutions. Consider an extreme case in 
which the principal has no information regarding the distribution of quality 
but the principal still wants to allocate according to quality. In this case, a 
bounded institution can only do harm. The principal has no information upon 
which to base the bound; any bound restricts the agent, who has relevant in-
formation about quality, without necessarily reducing the agent’s error. As a 
result, the principal should choose an unbounded institutional structure. 
More realistically, the principal possesses imperfect information about the 
distribution of quality in the subject population. All other things equal, the 
principal should prefer unbounded institutions when there is greater uncer-
tainty about the population distribution. 
 
41. To simplify matters, imagine a general “science fad,” with the NSF demonstrating excessive 





When the population is stable, the principal is more likely to obtain accu-
rate knowledge regarding the distribution of quality. Suppose, for example, 
that the principal learns something about the population distribution each 
year. When the population is stable, then, over time, the principal acquires 
highly accurate information. However, when the population is in flux (or, 
more precisely, when the population is in flux in an unpredictable way), then 
the predictive value of the principal’s previously acquired knowledge is re-
duced. With poorer quality information about the population distribution, the 
principal should be less inclined to impose the rigidities of a bound upon 
agents. 
To be more concrete, suppose Congress does not know the average quality 
of grant applications. In this case, an NSF grant-making budget becomes less 
attractive. The effectiveness of the budget depends heavily on Congress’s 
knowledge of the quality distribution of research applications and the predicta-
bility of those applications. If the distribution is unknown, then imposing a 
grant-making budget becomes less attractive because the budget itself cannot 
be tethered to the typical quality of grant applications. The more Congress feels 
it has a sense of the distribution of the quality of grant applications, the more 
Congress should rely on a bounded budget as opposed to an unbounded struc-
ture. 
What if the agent’s perception of variation in subject quality differs from 
the principal’s? Suppose, for example, that the biased agent and principal share 
the same rank ordering of subject quality but the principal and agent disagree 
about the difference in quality between two subjects. For instance, the principal 
thinks subject quality is tightly bunched, while the agent perceives greater dif-
ferences between subjects. Under these circumstances, a principal who knows 
the true distribution of subject quality can impose a stricter bound upon the 
agent. Not only should the principal compel the agent to award a bounded “av-
erage” allocation, but the principal should also restrict the variance of the allo-
cation. Agents would be required to submit an allocation with a specified mean 
and a specified variance, thereby forcing the agent to allow for variance in the 
subject population that accords with the principal’s perceptions. In this way, 
the principal can compel the agent to allocate in a more “bunched” manner 
than the agent would on his or her own.  
To be effective, this solution requires that the principal have very good in-
formation about the population (both its average quality and the dispersion of 
that quality), as well as a large number of subjects (to ensure that the disper-
sion of quality in the sample is similar to the dispersion of quality in the popu-
lation). With smaller sample sizes or imperfect information about the distribu-
tion of quality in the population, the principal should be more reluctant to 
impose a bound, and especially reluctant to impose a bound that restricts not 
only the average allocation, but also the dispersion of that allocation.  
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To be concrete, suppose that Congress thinks that the quality of most sci-
entific grant applications is “bunched.” The NSF, by contrast, has a higher 
opinion of the average quality of scientific grant applications but thinks that 
grant applications are more dispersed in quality. In this case, Congress should 
fix the NSF’s funding budget and tell the NSF to spread that budget more 
widely than it otherwise would. If Congress has no idea about bunching, or 
does not think there are enough applications for bunching to recur year after 
year, then Congress should be more inclined to impose a simpler budget with-
out providing any advice to the NSF about how it should disperse that fixed 
budget. 
Finally, can we say anything about the value of bounded institutions with 
agents who are worse than biased? For example, the agent’s opinion about the 
subject’s quality may be uncorrelated with the principal’s. In this case, neither 
bounded nor unbounded institutions offer much to the principal. Instead, the 
principal should avoid delegation to such a “maverick” agent. 
E. Rules Versus Bounds 
The model developed in this Part can also be applied to the choice of rules 
as opposed to bounds. A rule specifies agent action as a function of some ob-
servable characteristic of the subject. Unlike a bound, a rule does not mandate 
that the allocation to one subject depend upon the allocation to other subjects. 
Without more, rules merely generate an unbounded institutional structure in 
which agents are required to follow the rule. 
The desirability of rules relative to bounds (or unbounded structures with 
standards or discretion) depends upon the availability of a good proxy for sub-
ject quality. If subject quality is observable and verifiable, and therefore can be 
used as the basis for a rule, then rules are superior to both bounded and un-
bounded structures. When quality is observable and verifiable, the principal 
can obtain the best outcome by specifying precisely what the agent is to do 
with a subject of any quality. 
If there is no good proxy for subject quality that can be used as the basis for 
a rule, then rules become less attractive. When the principal instructs the agent 
to behave according to a rule that is a function of some subject characteristic 
that is only slightly correlated with quality, then the principal experiences a loss 
each time the agent executes the rule. The size of the loss depends upon the 
difference between the proxy and the underlying quality that is the principal’s 
true interest. If there are no characteristics that are proxies for subject quality, 
then the only rule available to the principal is to command that the agent allo-






In choosing between rules and bounds, the principal should prefer bounds 
under the following conditions, other things being equal:42 
 
1. Poor observable and verifiable proxies for subject quality. As indicated in 
the previous paragraph, as the correlation between a proxy for sub-
ject quality and true subject quality grows weaker, the performance 
of a rule that is a function of the proxy deteriorates. Bounds, which 
specify agent actions in the aggregate but do not specify allocations 
to a particular subject, become more attractive to the principal when 
the principal cannot effectively prescribe what to do with each sub-
ject. 
 
2. Less quality variation from subject to subject and more subjects per agent. 
As described in Part II.B, bounds function better under these circum-
stances. When bounds perform well, the principal prefers them to 
imperfect rules, all else being equal. 
 
In the absence of a perfect proxy for subject quality, bounds should be pre-
ferred to rules as the number of subjects per agent grows large. As shown in 
Part II.C, bounds approximate the ideal outcome when the number of subjects 
grows large. Imperfect rules, by contrast, do not become less imperfect when 
they are applied to more subjects. As a result, bounds outperform rules as the 
number of subjects grows large. 
This Part has examined the relative performance of bounded and unbound-
ed institutional structures under many different conditions. The next Part ap-
plies these lessons to enrich a number of discussions concerning the way in 
which legislatures should delegate to agencies and courts. 
i i i .  bounded versus unbounded structures in action 
Bounded institutional structures are common but far from omnipresent. 
For example, government spending is subject to monetary budgets in many 
important instances, but Congress chooses unbounded entitlement-like spend-
ing in many other cases. This Part applies the analysis of bounded institutions 
to a number of pressing problems of institutional design and makes normative 
suggestions regarding the appropriate use of bounds. 
 
42. See infra Appendix Parts C.4, E for proofs. 
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A. Traditional Regulatory Oversight Versus Regulatory Budgeting 
The analytical framework just developed applies to the problem of control-
ling administrative agencies. Administrative agencies can be thought of as 
agents of a principal—perhaps Congress, the President, or the American peo-
ple. Agencies evaluate a “population” of potential regulations. The principal 
cannot evaluate the entire population and therefore delegates the task to the 
agency. Each potential regulation has a “trait,” which is the regulation’s suita-
bility for achieving the goal of the principal.43 
Bias presents a recurring concern in the analysis of administrative agencies. 
Agencies are often presumed to have interests that diverge from those of the 
principal. The agency may differ from the principal in its evaluation of poten-
tial regulations. Indeed, mitigating such conflicts is one of the central questions 
of administrative law and administrative law scholarship. This scholarship de-
bates the efficacy of different mechanisms, such as cost-benefit analysis, judi-
cial oversight, executive branch oversight, and public oversight (for example, 
the Freedom of Information Act), for reducing costs of errors.44 Each method 
brings pluses and minuses, but all of the methods leave agencies unbounded.45 
No matter how strict the oversight, any proposed rule that survives the over-
sight process becomes a regulation. So long as the cost-benefit analysis proves 
that the regulation has positive net benefits, or the regulation follows the  
statute, or the regulation passes through appropriate executive or judicial over-
sight, the regulation may be issued. Because there is no hard ceiling or floor on 
regulations, agency regulations are promulgated in an unbounded institutional 
environment. 
The regulatory environment need not be unbounded. The number—or 
more plausibly the value46—of regulations could be constrained by statute. The 
much-discussed concept of a “regulatory budget” imposes limitations on the 
 
43. This goal could be maximization of social welfare or a different goal such as minimization of 
environmental harm. 
44. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 
165 (1999); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 533 (1989); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 469 (1986); Richard J. Pierce & Sidney A. Shapiro, Political and Judicial Re-
view of Agency Action, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1175 (1981); Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and 
the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
45. More precisely, they leave the agency without a direct bound. The agency is resource con-
strained by its budget. 
46. If the number of regulations is constrained but their value is not, agencies could combine 
similar regulations into larger regulations. Such regulations would comply with the numeri-






costs that may be imposed by agencies via regulation. A recent Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report described a regulato-
ry budget as follows: 
The regulatory budget operates by close analogy to the traditional fiscal 
process. For example, each year (or at some longer interval), the gov-
ernment would establish an upper limit on the costs of its regulatory 
activities to the economy and would apportion this sum among the in-
dividual regulatory agencies. This would presumably involve a budget 
proposal developed by a regulatory oversight body in negotiation with 
regulatory agencies, approved by the executive branch of government, 
and submitted for legislative review, revision and passage. Once final 
budget appropriations were in force, each agency would be obliged to 
live within its regulatory budget for the time period in question.47 
A regulatory budget provides the bounded institutional counterpart to the 
conventional unbounded regulatory environment.48 Although the concept of a 
regulatory budget is more than thirty years old, regulatory budgets are rarely 
implemented.49 This section analyzes when to choose regulatory budgeting 
versus conventional regulatory oversight as a method for reducing agency er-
rors and bias. 
The analysis in the previous two Parts offers several reasons to believe that 
bounded institutional structures such as regulatory budgeting may prove supe-
rior to traditional unbounded oversight methods. Bounded structures are par-
ticularly attractive when agent bias and error are more pervasive, when there 
are no accurate rules to restrict agent discretion, when the cost of agent errors 
is nonlinear, and when the sample population assessed by an agent is large. 
These features describe many regulatory environments. At the same time, other 
features of the regulatory environment, such as the principal’s probable igno-
rance of the population distribution of regulations and the difficulty of quanti-
fying a regulatory budget, counsel against universal application of a bounded 
 
47. Pub. Governance Comm., A Primer on Regulatory Budgets, 2010 OECD J. ON BUDGETING, no. 
3, at 2-3, http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage 
=en&cote=GOV/PGC/SBO (2010) [http://perma.cc/6J7V-5AML]. 
48. A deregulatory agenda could be accomplished by a negative regulatory budget, which would 
force regulators to lower the cost of existing regulations. 
49. See Sam Batkins, Can a Regulatory Budget Trim Red Tape?, REGBLOG (Aug. 28,  
2013), http://www.regblog.org/2013/08/28-batkins-regulatory-budget.html [http://perma 
.cc/5DVK-7MGY] (“The idea of a regulatory budget has been around for decades. Unfortu-
nately, given the current political environment, the idea of placing a budgetary cap on the 
overall costs of regulation will likely remain for some time just an idea that regulatory schol-
ars will continue to debate without any practical results.”). 
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institutional structure. Instead of an all-or-nothing approach to regulatory 
budgeting, wherein a regulatory budget is either applied to all agencies or 
none, the analysis provided here suggests that a regulatory budget may be ap-
propriate for some agencies but not others. Alternatively, it may be appropriate 
for the head of an agency to impose a regulatory budget on a sub-agency but 
inappropriate for Congress to impose one on an entire agency. 
1. EPA Regulations: The Case for Bounded Institutions 
To be concrete, consider a possible environmental regulation issued by the 
EPA. When promulgating environmental regulations, the EPA serves as an 
agent of Congress and the President under a variety of statutes, including the 
Clean Air Act. Many have accused the EPA of having a pro-environmental, an-
ti-business bias. Oversight mechanisms, such as cost-benefit analysis, executive 
oversight via the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), and ju-
dicial review, focus heavily on the EPA’s regulations. The EPA has authority to 
consider a wide range of regulations, from clean water standards50 to green-
house gas emissions.51 In addition, crafting environmental regulations is hard 
to specify by rule. Indeed, many environmental statutes specify vague stand-
ards for the EPA to follow.52 
Suppose that the EPA—pursuant to its authority under the Clean Air Act—
is considering a set of regulations to remove air pollutants.53 Further suppose 
that the EPA is biased: it places a value on clean air that is double the value that 
Congress would place on clean air. In addition, Congress lacks the ability to 
specify by rule the regulations that it views as desirable. Finally, suppose that 
Congress has a sense of the amount of GDP it is willing to spend on clean air 
and specifies this number in a regulatory budget.54 
Under these conditions, a regulatory budget outperforms conventional 
regulatory oversight mechanisms. The budget compels the EPA to regulate ac-
cording to Congress’s preferred amount. But even if the EPA is constrained in 
the costs of regulations it can promulgate (“how much regulation”), how do 
we know that the agency will choose the right regulations (“which regula-
tions”)? The EPA chooses the right regulations because it values clean air twice 
 
50. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012). 
51. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012). 
52. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6912(a)(1) (2012) (authorizing, without more detail, the EPA Adminis-
trator to “prescribe, in consultation with Federal, State, and regional authorities, such regu-
lations as are necessary to carry out his functions under this chapter”). 
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2012). 





as much as Congress does. It will try to maximize the value of clean air, and 
achieving this objective requires the EPA to choose the regulations that provide 
the cleanest air possible subject to the budget constraint imposed by Congress. 
These are the same regulations that Congress would choose. Because Congress 
has specified its clean air “budget,” the fact that the EPA values clean air more 
than does Congress imposes no costs.55 
Conventional oversight mechanisms, by contrast, fail to guarantee that the 
EPA’s bias in favor of clean air will produce the right regulations. Judicial over-
sight means that the EPA will choose the regulations that are easiest to justify 
under the relevant oversight standard. Choosing regulations in this manner 
leads to over-regulation because of the EPA’s bias. In addition, the EPA’s regu-
lations may not produce the cleanest air per unit cost. Instead of seeking the 
most efficient regulations, the EPA seeks the regulations that are most likely to 
pass judicial muster. 
A similar story applies to executive oversight. The EPA will attempt to im-
plement its clean air bias by choosing regulations that appeal to its executive 
overseers at OIRA or other relevant centers of oversight within the White 
House. As with judicial oversight, these regulations will likely be greater in 
quantity and less efficient than the regulations that would be chosen under a 
regulatory budget. 
Among the traditional unbounded oversight mechanisms, cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) provides the closest analogue to a regulatory budget. CBA re-
quires agencies to quantify the benefits and the costs of each regulation, and 
regulations are warranted if benefits exceed costs. Cost estimation is therefore 
required of both regulatory budgeting and cost-benefit analysis. CBA differs 
from regulatory budgeting in asking for quantification of regulatory benefits. 
CBA’s quantification of benefits yields advantages and disadvantages. On 
the plus side, accurate calculation of costs and benefits produces optimal regu-
lation. Congress wants regulations for which benefits exceed costs, and accu-
rate CBA realizes this aim. The bounded structure of regulatory budgeting, by 
contrast, introduces rigidity that is costly if agents accurately estimate costs. An 
agency subject to a regulatory budget may forego positive value CBA projects 
or undertake negative value CBA projects. 
CBA’s disadvantages arise when the agent has a biased view of the benefits 
of a regulation. In our hypothetical, cost-benefit analysis produces too much 
 
55. This conclusion assumes that Congress, as the principal, places the “right” value on envi-
ronmental quality as measured by, for example, clean air. This value may be high or low. A 
high value would correspond to a quantitatively large regulatory budget. The key assump-
tion is that, whatever Congress or another principal desires, the EPA has alternative prefer-
ences (that is, the EPA is biased). 
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regulation because the EPA values clean air (the benefits of regulation) more 
than Congress does. Using CBA, the EPA will choose the right regulations—
the ones that produce the cleanest air per dollar—but there will be too much 
regulation because the EPA values clean air more than Congress does. If OIRA 
or some other oversight body can “correct” the EPA’s overvaluation, then CBA 
can produce the right amount and types of regulations, but this requires the 
oversight body to monitor effectively the EPA’s estimates of both costs and 
benefits.  
By bounding the cost of regulations, by contrast, regulatory budgeting does 
not demand that Congress or any other oversight body obtain good infor-
mation about the value of clean air. So long as the EPA shares Congress’s rank 
ordering of benefits of clean air, and the costs of the EPA’s regulations are 
quantifiable, the bounded regulatory budget produces an efficient outcome—
though, as indicated in the next section, this does not hold true when some as-
sumptions are relaxed. 
2. EPA Regulations: The Case Against Bounded Institutions 
The previous section told a rosy story about the benefits of a bounded insti-
tution—regulatory budgeting—relative to the performance of more conven-
tional unbounded institutions. The case for regulatory budgeting, however, 
rests on several assumptions that may be unrealistic. This section considers the 
efficacy of the bounded institution when these assumptions are relaxed. 
a. Quantifiability 
In order to impose a bound, Congress (the principal) must be able to quan-
tify and measure the value of the bound. In the regulatory budgeting context, 
the bound is the cost imposed on the public by regulations issued by the agen-
cy. From an ex ante perspective, the cost imposed by regulation is very difficult 
to know with precision. Instead, the costs must be estimated. (Indeed, this 
prediction difficulty is one of the weaknesses of cost-benefit analysis.56) Regu-
latory budgeting requires that agency discretion be curtailed by a bound prem-
ised on an estimate. Other oversight mechanisms, such as judicial oversight, 
may be flawed—but they don’t rely on a false precision. 
 
56. See Stephanie Riegg Cellini & James Edwin Kee, Cost-Effectiveness and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
in HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL PROGRAM EVALUATION 493, 497 (3d ed. 2010) (“[I]n an ex ante 
[cost-benefit] analysis, the estimation of costs and benefits is most difficult because they 
have not yet occurred. In this case the analysis will require a significant number of assump-





The critique is an important one. Regulatory budgeting is not like ordinary 
budgeting. If estimates of regulatory costs prove to be inaccurate or manipula-
ble, then regulatory budgets do not yield the intended outcomes. If the EPA 
manipulates costs to appear lower than they actually are, then the EPA will 
produce too much clean air regulation. And if some types of regulation have 
costs that are easier to manipulate than others, then we may get the wrong reg-
ulations in addition to having too many. 
But we should also not overstate the quantifiability problem for regulatory 
budgeting. CBA, which assumes a large role in the EPA regulatory process, re-
quires the EPA to estimate both costs and benefits. Regulatory budgeting re-
quires only costs to be estimated.57 And costs, which are often direct and pecu-
niary (such as the cost of pollution-reducing equipment for a power plant), are 
likely easier to estimate than benefits.58 If CBA can work, then so can regulato-
ry budgeting.  
b. Knowledge of the Distributional Parameters 
A more problematic assumption that boosted the case for a regulatory 
budget at the EPA was the assumption that Congress knows the distribution of 
regulatory outcomes. This means that—although Congress cannot perfectly 
evaluate any particular regulation—it has a good sense of the “population pa-
rameters” of environmental regulations.59 A Congress that has a rough sense of 
the goals it wants to achieve through environmental regulation, but not a good 
sense of precisely how to achieve them, can reasonably choose the dollar value 
of regulations it wants, leaving the content of the particular regulations to the 
EPA. But if Congress does not have a sense of what is out there, then its bound 
will likely be flawed. And an EPA subject to a flawed bound may produce 
worse outcomes than an unbounded but biased EPA. 
 
57. This is not to say that regulatory budgeting eliminates the problem of estimating benefits. 
The next section considers the problematic assumption that Congress knows the distribu-
tion of outcomes from different regulations. This assumption essentially assumes away the 
problem of estimating benefits. 
58. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 58 (1998) (noting 
that “the cost side of the equation implicates fewer ‘soft’ considerations than the benefits 
side”); Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and En-
vironmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (2002) (“The benefits side of a typical 
cost-benefit analysis is quite controversial, laden with huge uncertainties, based largely up-
on numerous modeling exercises, and does not rely to any large degree upon empirical anal-
ysis. The cost side of the analysis is less controversial, but still fraught with uncertainty.”). 
59. Because there are presumably an infinite number of very bad regulations, knowledge of the 
population parameters requires Congress to know the distribution of plausible environmen-
tal regulations. 
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Legislators are not environmental rule-makers, and Congress is unlikely to 
have a good sense of the distribution of the effects of environmental regula-
tions. This provides a strong argument against imposing a regulatory budget 
on the EPA. 
But bounded institutions in the form of regulatory budgets may have bene-
fits at other points in the regulatory oversight process. For example, OIRA, 
which is more sophisticated than Congress in evaluating environmental regula-
tions, may be able to acquire a sense of the distribution of possible environ-
mental regulations, even if it does not have the resources to examine every pos-
sible regulation. In addition, OIRA may have less of a pro-environment bias 
than the EPA.60 As a result, a regulatory budget formed by OIRA may have the 
advantages of a bounded institution without some of the disadvantages that 
accompany a regulatory budget formed by Congress. Indeed, learning the dis-
tribution of regulatory possibilities and then “getting out of the way” by im-
posing a regulatory budget may prove to be an easier task for OIRA than the 
task of overseeing all regulations and cost-benefit analyses. 
And we should not be too quick to dismiss the possibility of a congressional 
regulatory budget for the EPA. Congress knows little about the distribution of 
environmental regulations, but it also knows little about budgeting require-
ments for different agencies—and still somehow passes an annual appropria-
tions bill (or at least a continuing resolution). Regulatory budgeting may not 
be all that different from conventional bounded budgeting procedures. 
For example, the EPA might submit an annual regulatory budget request to 
Congress each year. These submissions might give Congress the opportunity 
to learn more about the distribution of regulatory effects for environmental 
regulations. While Congress is unlikely to attain a comprehensive understand-
ing of the population of existing and possible environmental regulations, it—or 
at least the relevant committee staffs—may be able to achieve a rough sense of 
the possibilities. If regulatory bias is a significant problem, then Congress may 
be better off with a regulatory budget based on imperfect distributional infor-
mation than the unbounded regulatory systems currently in operation. 
B. Mandatory Versus Discretionary Spending 
We have already examined the problem of government spending on scien-
tific research through the NSF. But the bounded versus unbounded divide also 
pervades government appropriations. Government spending takes two primary 
forms: discretionary and mandatory. Discretionary spending refers to “the 
 






budget authority provided by annual appropriations acts and the outlays that 
result from that budget authority.”61 Appropriations acts (or continuing reso-
lutions extending previous appropriations acts) specify spending amounts for 
federal government activities. For example, the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2012 specifies “[f]or compensation of the President, including an ex-
pense allowance at the rate of $50,000 per annum as authorized by 3 U.S.C. 
§ 102, $450,000.”62 
Mandatory spending means “budget authority and outlays provided by 
permanent laws.”63 Medicare, for example, is enacted by 42 U.S.C. § 1395 and 
does not require annual renewal. Instead, Medicare and Social Security are 
funded by federal trust funds that require mandatory transfers from designated 
revenue sources.64 Many mandatory spending programs, such as Social Securi-
ty and Medicare, are commonly known as “entitlement” programs. 
Entitlement spending programs constitute unbounded institutional struc-
tures. Congress is the principal, and the agency charged with administering the 
entitlement program (such as the Social Security Administration or the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid) is the agent. There is no restriction on how much 
or how little is spent on entitlement programs. Instead, the costs of entitlement 
programs are generally determined by eligibility requirements. For example, 
Medicare applies to all citizens and permanent residents aged sixty-five and 
older.65 In entitlement programs, the “to whom” question is specified by law, 
but the question of “how much” is unbounded. Indeed, the “how much” ques-
tion is generally determined on an as-needed basis. If doctors and patients de-
mand more medical spending for those over age sixty-five, then Medicare will 
cost more. The beginning of the Medicare Act, for example, states: 
 
61. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-11 § 
20.9, at 35 (2014) [hereinafter OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-11] (emphasis omitted), http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a11_current_year/s20.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/LS5E-BFB5]. 
62. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, div. C, tit. II, 125 Stat. 786, 892 
(2011). 
63. OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-11, supra note 61, § 20.9, at 35. 
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-15(a) (2012). This section provides that “[n]o officer or employee of 
the United States shall—(1) delay the deposit of any amount into (or delay the credit of any 
amount to) any Federal fund or otherwise vary from the normal terms, procedures, or tim-
ing for making such deposits or credits.” Federal funds are defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-
15(c) to mean “(1) the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund [Social Security 
for retirees]; (2) the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund [Social Security for the disa-
bled]; (3) the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund [Medicare Part A]; and (4) the Federal 
Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund [Medicare Part B].” 
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2012). 
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Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any Federal 
officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the prac-
tice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided, 
or over the selection, tenure, or compensation of any officer or employ-
ee of any institution, agency, or person providing health services . . . .66 
Discretionary spending programs, by contrast, are bounded institutional 
structures. Congress is the principal, and the department or agency receiving 
the appropriation is the agent. A department or program cannot spend more in 
a given year than its appropriation. According to the Consolidated Appropria-
tions Act, the President’s salary is $450,000, no more or less.67 Once spending 
has been appropriated, the executive branch even has limited ability to spend 
less than the appropriated amount.68 The appropriation provides a bound to 
the cost of any programs. This bound contrasts with the explicitly unbounded 
nature of Medicare spending. 
Most mandatory spending programs can be converted into discretionary 
spending programs. Medicare is an unbounded entitlement spending program, 
but it could be converted to a bounded discretionary spending program by ap-
propriating a certain amount each year for each of its functions. This would re-
quire Medicare “rationing,” but rationing is commonplace in government 
spending. The administrator of the Medicare program, the Centers for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services (CMMS), was appropriated a certain amount, 
$3,879,476,000 in fiscal year 2012,69 and must “ration” this appropriation to 
carry out CMMS’s responsibilities as well as possible. So Medicare’s adminis-
trators are subject to rationing, even if the program they administer is not. In-
deed, there are many proposals to convert unbounded entitlement spending 
programs into bounded programs. Proposals to convert Medicaid payments to 
states from sharing formulas to block grants of fixed dollar amounts seek to 
transform Medicaid from an unbounded spending program to a bounded 
spending program.70 
 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012). 
67. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, div C., tit. II, 125 Stat. 786, 892 
(2011).  
68. Under the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, § 1012, 88 Stat. 297, 333-34 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 684 (2012)), the Presi-
dent can propose that certain amounts appropriated by Congress be rescinded. If both 
houses of Congress do not approve this proposal, then the appropriation must be made 
available. Id. § 1017. 
69. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 1075 (2011). 
70. See, e.g., Paul Ryan, The Path to Prosperity: Restoring America’s Promise 38-41,  
H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET (Apr. 5, 2011), http://budget.house.gov/UploadedFiles 






Conversely, most discretionary spending programs can be converted into 
mandatory spending programs. Instead of appropriating money to depart-
ments and agencies on an annual basis as Congress does with bounded discre-
tionary spending, Congress could pass laws funding such departments in per-
petuity, on an as-needed basis. The President’s salary could be determined by 
an agency that sets salaries to be comparable to similar positions in other sec-
tors. While as-needed funding may sound curious, recall that this is exactly the 
unbounded framework that characterizes entitlement programs such as Medi-
care and Social Security.71 Medicare pays for all eligible expenses, with no ex-
plicit rationing.  
 Scholars have offered surprisingly little analysis of the efficacy of mandato-
ry versus discretionary spending programs.72 But the bounded versus un-
bounded institutional structure developed here provides a framework for un-
derstanding this issue. Mandatory spending rules work best in contexts that 
favor unbounded rules. Discretionary spending formulas function better when 
a bound cabins agent error effectively. 
 The largest entitlement spending programs often determine eligibility by 
rule according to a clearly defined metric. Medicare, for example, applies to 
permanent residents over age sixty-five.73 Social Security eligibility is deter-
mined by a statutorily defined rule that is a function of contributions to the 
program and age.74 Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP) eligibility are primarily functions of income, age, and family status—all 
quantifiable and verifiable metrics.75 The analysis above suggests that when 
rules regarding verifiable metrics are available, unbounded institutional struc-
 
providing block grants to states for Medicaid expenses combined the transformation of the 
program to a bounded structure with an attempt to cut costs, this need not be so. Block 
grants could be adjusted annually to account for actual medical price inflation but retain a 
bounded structure in the sense that they are block grants. 
71. It is also not dissimilar from how salaries are set for executives of major companies. Com-
pensation consultants typically choose a peer group of executives and propose a salary for 
the subject executive based on the salaries of members of this peer group. See Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 789-91 (2002). 
72. For a recent exception, see T. Renee Bowen, Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, Mandatory Versus 
Discretionary Spending: The Status Quo Effect, AM. ECON. REV. (forthcoming). 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c(1) (2012); id. § 1395i-2(a)(1). 
74. See, e.g., id. § 402. For an up-to-date description of how monthly Social Security payments 
depend on amounts contributed, see Primary Insurance Amount, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http:// 
www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/piaformula.html [http://perma.cc/V67P-H9GH]. 
75. For an overview of Medicaid eligibility requirements, see Eligibility, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE  
& MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By 
-Topics/Eligibility/Eligibility.html [http://perma.cc/N8ZM-LWYY]. 
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tures tend to outperform bounded structures. Bounded institutional structures 
impose some rigidity but reduce bias. Because rules reduce the scope for bias, 
imposing a bounded structure when a rule is available—as in the case of Medi-
care, Social Security, and Medicaid—introduces rigidity with relatively little 
scope for bias reduction. 
But the efficacy of rules is not constant across all entitlement programs. 
Rules function particularly well in the context of the Old-Age and Survivors 
(OAS) insurance component of the Social Security system.76 Because the Social 
Security benefit rule for retirees answers the questions of “to whom” and “how 
much,” imposing a bounded dollar amount on the program would introduce 
rigidity without diminishing any obvious sources of bias.77 For Medicare and 
Medicaid, rules provide a clear answer to the eligibility question (“to whom”), 
but no obvious answer to the question of “how much” the program should 
spend. At present, the amount is determined at the discretion of other agents, 
such as doctors and patients. These agents may well be biased.78 As a result, 
Medicare may be a candidate for a rule/bound combination, in which the rule 
determines eligibility and the bound determines how much can be spent. In-
deed, the bound may be expressed in per capita terms—for example, a budget 
of $X per eligible participant—to minimize the rigidity imposed by the 
bound.79 With a hard budget in place for a fixed group of subjects, agents such 
as doctors and administrators would find biases constrained by the budget. 
Forced to keep spending within the bound, they may allocate more effectively 
in the partially bounded context than in the unbounded context that character-
izes Medicare and Medicaid currently. 
The disability insurance (“DI”) component of Social Security80 also creates 
tensions for the unbounded structure. For disability, the “how much” per per-
son question is determined by rule. Once someone is found to be disabled, he 
 
76. For the statutory details of the program, see 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2012). 
77. One may think that the benefit rule is overly generous or overly stingy. This is not a prob-
lem of bias by the agent but rather a choice of the principal that formulated the benefit rule. 
As a result, a bounded budget constraint would not solve this type of problem; the princi-
pal’s generosity or stinginess will carry over to the bounded budget.  
78. See, e.g., Leana Wen, Before the Prescription, Ask About Your Doctor’s Finances, NPR: SHOTS  
(Dec. 14, 2013, 5:50 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/12/14/250714833/before-the 
-prescription-ask-about-your-doctors-finances [http://perma.cc/AF8M-QBNV] (explaining 
that many doctors have financial incentives to order more medical tests). 
79. If there are an uncertain number of Medicare participants but a fixed budget, then the un-
certainty about the number of participants adds another layer of uncertainty about the costs 
of the program. If the bound is expressed in per capita terms, the uncertainty about the 
number of participants does not affect the total uncertainty about the (per capita) costs of 
the program. 





or she receives benefits according to a formula based on past earnings.81 De-
termining disability (“to whom”), however, is not amenable to rule-delimited 
decision making because disability is a multi-dimensional and context-specific 
determination—what is disabling for one person or one job may not be disa-
bling in another context. At present, disability determinations are made 
through a complex administrative process that must consider a wide variety of 
illnesses and definitions of disability.82 This process, which is controlled by 
administrators, may be prone to bias or systematic error. In addition, the 
population of individuals applying for DI is likely to be relatively constant or to 
change predictably from year to year. Under these conditions, bounds are well 
suited to cabining agent bias or error. 
The bound on DI could be introduced in one of two related ways. First, 
Congress could place a bound on the number of disability recipients per year. If 
each administrator of the system were to receive a random sample of a large 
number of DI applicants, then the bound could be subdivided such that each 
administrator can make a bounded number of disability determinations. A 
“curve” for DI determinations would fulfill many of the criteria for an optimal 
bounded structure. DI determinations are made by agents who may be biased 
and error prone but likely share Congress’s general ranking of disability severi-
ty. In these circumstances, a fixed number of “yes” determinations per agent 
ameliorates bias and error; in addition, establishing a “curve” will not induce a 
great deal of incorrect DI decisions, because each administrator will see a large 
number of randomly drawn DI applicants, and the distribution of disability in 
the population is likely to be constant or to predictably change from year to 
year. Second, a bounded dollar budget could be placed on the disability insur-
ance system. In this case, a primacy rule would be used to decide what to do 
when the bounded budget conflicts with the benefits mandated by rule. 
Discretionary spending programs often display the characteristics of pro-
grams that would benefit from bounds. Consider the budgets of most cabinet 
departments and administrations. Unlike income support programs such as 
Social Security, it is difficult to specify budgets via rule; the decision regarding 
how much should be spent is too multidimensional. Delegating budgeting de-
cisions to agents in an unbounded way may lead to considerable bias. A man-
datory program calling for agencies to receive whatever budget they request 
would likely lead to too much spending. The agency will often have a more 
 
81. See Ellen O’Brien, Social Security Disability Insurance: A Primer, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST.  
11 (Apr. 2009), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/i28_ssdi.pdf [http://perma.cc/3B3L 
-LXCZ]. 
82. See Disability Evaluation Under Social Security, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov 
/disability/professionals/bluebook [http://perma.cc/5DBT-KHJT]. 
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generous view of its spending needs than Congress does. Just as the EPA, for 
example, may issue regulations that exceed Congress’s ideal level, so too might 
the EPA request a greater appropriation than Congress deems warranted, be-
cause a higher appropriation enables the EPA to protect the environment more 
effectively. In addition, the annual nature of the appropriations process gives 
Congress an opportunity to get a sense of the distribution of needs in different 
agencies and how likely these needs are to vary. This learning process allows 
Congress to set reasonable bounds. In total, many programs subject to discre-
tionary spending allocations have attributes that make them conducive to 
bounded institutional structures. 
While the bounded institutional structure of many discretionary spending 
programs is appropriate, there are other currently bounded programs that—
based on the analysis above—should probably be unbounded. Consider FEMA 
spending. Disasters, and especially large disasters, are rare events. Their num-
ber and cost may change dramatically from year to year. With such a variable 
distribution, a bounded institutional structure can produce bad outcomes. If 
the budget is fixed but there is a much higher than expected number of disas-
ters, then disaster victims may receive much less than Congress would like. If 
there are fewer disasters and FEMA has a fixed budget, then disaster victims 
may receive too much. Both possibilities are costly and will occur frequently if 
FEMA has a fixed budget to provide for disaster relief. A mandatory spending 
program that dictates that disaster victims should receive what FEMA thinks 
appropriate, though prone to bias, would avoid the bad outcomes of over-
allocation if there are few disasters or under-allocation if there are many disas-
ters. Of course, Congress can augment a discretionary annual appropriation 
with an emergency appropriation in the event of higher than expected disaster 
costs. This effectively replaces a bounded discretionary spending allocation 
with an unbounded allocation. But passing supplementary bills imposes costs. 
Congress may not be able to pass bills expeditiously, as demonstrated by the 
recent brouhaha concerning a relief bill for the costs of Hurricane Sandy.83 
Congress is also unlikely to pass a bill reducing FEMA spending if there are 
fewer disasters than expected.84 
 
83. See, e.g., Raymond Hernandez, Stalling of Storm Aid Makes Northeast Republicans Furious, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/nyregion/congressional 
-members-blast-house-for-ignoring-storm-aid-bill.html [http://perma.cc/C6NA-BP2R]. 
84. FEMA gets a budget from annual appropriations bills. See Consolidated and Further Con-
tinuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, div. D, tit. III, 127 Stat. 198, 357 (2013) 
(listing FEMA’s initial budget for the year). Supplemental bills are sometimes passed if this 
budget proves inadequate. See Hurricane Sandy Relief Bill, Pub. L. 113-1, H.R. 41, 127 Stat. 3 
(2013). If FEMA can withhold its spending, then the over-allocation problem is reduced. Al-
lowing FEMA to withhold spending, however, transforms the agency’s institutional struc-





Some types of defense spending also appear ill-suited to bounded spending 
restrictions. While some aspects of defense spending have predictable distribu-
tions from year to year (for example, regular personnel costs, long-term pro-
curement programs), other aspects of military spending are less predictable. 
Wars are expensive, and we cannot rely on the law of large numbers to guaran-
tee that the expenses average out. Exclusive reliance on bounded defense 
spending would produce too much spending in peaceful years and too little in 
times of war. As a practical matter, our budget process recognizes this mis-
match. While much of defense spending is bounded and “discretionary,” addi-
tional expenditures required for war are often the subject of supplementary 
budget proceedings.85 But, as with FEMA spending, these supplementary pro-
ceedings are simply another way to make a bounded program less bounded. 
Passing additional war-related spending bills imposes transaction costs, and it 
is unlikely that times with less than the average number of wars will lead to a 
reduction in military expenditures. Both of these considerations weigh in favor 
of an unbounded spending program for war-related costs. 
The fact that wartime spending does not fit all the criteria for an ideal dis-
cretionary program does not mean that an unbounded program is superior. 
War-related decisions may be subject to considerable bias from agents, and a 
bound would mitigate this bias. In addition, war-related decisions are difficult 
to specify via rule. As a result, the hybrid system currently in use, with bound-
ed defense discretionary spending and periodic war-related supplementary 
budgets, may do the best job of containing bias (by requiring legislative de-
bate) while encouraging the flexibility needed to handle uncertain war expens-
es. 
C. Minority Set-Asides and Croson 
The bounded versus unbounded framework applies to the question of mi-
nority set-asides discussed by the Supreme Court in Fullilove v. Klutznick86 and 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.87 Minority set-asides seek to remedy past 
and current discrimination by requiring minimum percentages of the value of 
government contracts to be used to hire minority business enterprises. In 
Croson, for instance, the City of Richmond, with a 50% African-American pop-
ulation, “required prime contractors to whom the city awarded construction 
 
85. See, e.g., Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-11, 
117 Stat. 559. 
86. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
87. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of the contract to one 
or more Minority Business Enterprises” (MBEs).88 
The Croson policy and similar policies adopted by other states are bounded 
institutional structures. The principal—the City of Richmond—sought to ame-
liorate past and present discrimination.89 Therefore, it bounded the choices of 
its agents—the prime contractors. Concerned about bias by the prime contrac-
tors toward some subjects (MBE subcontractors), Richmond required that 
30% of subcontracts be granted to MBEs.90 
The City of Richmond could have chosen an unbounded structure to com-
pensate for possible agent bias. For example, Richmond could have insisted 
that prime contractors give MBEs a “close look.” With this unbounded policy, 
Richmond could have stated its policy preferences but given the agents discre-
tion in fulfilling the city’s preferences. On the other hand, Richmond could 
have said that any bid by MBEs that was within 5% of the lowest non-MBE bid 
must be accepted. This alternative would have imposed a rule relating to sub-
contracting with minorities but would not have bounded the dollar value of 
subcontracts with MBEs. 
As detailed in the previous sections, Richmond’s choice of minority set-
asides—a bounded structure—offered advantages and disadvantages. If the 
City of Richmond cannot judge subcontractor bids but has a good sense of 
how many MBEs it wants to hire, then the minority set-aside can produce an 
ideal outcome. The prime contractors would choose the best MBEs using their 
superior judgment of quality, but the prime contractors’ racially biased prefer-
ences relative to the city would be offset by the set-aside requiring that 30% of 
value be granted to MBE subcontractors. 
In other circumstances, the set-aside policy would produce inefficiencies 
relative to unbounded alternatives. If prime contractors are not particularly bi-
ased against MBEs, then the set-aside introduces rigidity without much bene-
fit. If Richmond does not have a realistic sense of its preference for MBE sub-
contractors, then the set-aside could produce very inefficient results, with too 
many expensive or ill-qualified MBEs. If the quality of MBEs varies widely, or 
if there are only one or two subcontracts per contractor, then there is a much 
greater chance that the set-aside will result in more MBEs than the city would 
want if it had perfect knowledge of subcontractor quality and race. 
This rigidity was criticized by the Supreme Court in finding Richmond’s 
policy unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment: 
 
88. Id. at 477. 
89. I simplify the principal’s goals here for the purposes of explication.  
90. 488 U.S. at 477. The bound was one-dimensional. Prime contractors could hire more than 





The Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete 
for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race. 
To whatever racial group these citizens belong, their “personal rights” 
to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid 
rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public deci-
sionmaking.91 
There is no doubt that, as described, the bounded set-aside creates a “rigid 
rule.” But the analysis of this Essay demonstrates that, under the right condi-
tions, the Supreme Court’s critique of Richmond’s policy is inapt. Indeed, a 
bounded set-aside can produce an ideal outcome that would not be feasible 
with a seemingly less rigid rule. 
When there are many MBE and non-MBE subcontractors, a set-aside be-
comes one factor among many that determines who receives subcontracts. For 
example, a bounded rule, such as a set-aside, does not “erect[] race as the sole 
criterion . . . of public decisionmaking.”92 The set-aside ensures that race is ac-
counted for, but the use of bounded criteria allows for consideration of an infi-
nite number of dimensions of “quality.” Instead of requiring subcontractors to 
comply with a formula for how to weigh MBE status against other dimensions 
of quality such as price and expertise, the set-aside allows each contractor to 
make decisions based on the criteria that he or she thinks are most important—
while ensuring that the interest in ameliorating discrimination is realized. In 
addition, the bound may treat people with “equal dignity”93: if the size of the 
set-aside quota accurately reflects Richmond’s legitimate interests in ameliorat-
ing past discrimination, then the set-aside allows contractors to make subtle 
and individualized decisions in choosing among MBEs and non-MBEs. 
In Croson, there was only one MBE. In these circumstances, bounded insti-
tutions such as set-asides perform poorly. Set-asides introduce rigidity, such as 
(in Croson) requiring the only marginally qualified MBE to be chosen as a sub-
contractor. Such rigidity might appear to preclude equal dignity and respect in 
decision making. But this does not mean that set-asides are generally a bad 
idea. In cases where (1) current or past racial bias is prevalent, (2) there are 
many MBE and non-MBE subcontractors, (3) there is no viable rule dictating 
the weight to be placed on race relative to other factors, and (4) the principal 
cannot judge the quality of subcontractors, then, as shown in Part II, set-asides 
can produce excellent outcomes. 
 
91. Id. at 493. 
92. Contra id. 
93. Id. 
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To sum up, analyzing Croson in light of our study of bounded versus un-
bounded institutions suggests that the problem is not racial set-asides per se, 
but rather the use of set-asides in appropriate circumstances. 
D. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Decision Making 
In many contexts, society charges an agent with making a series of deci-
sions about subjects. The agent’s decision-making process is often unbound-
ed—even though the agent may well be biased in a socially undesirable man-
ner. The determination of disability benefits described above is one such cir-
circumstance. Society has some sense of who should receive disability benefits 
and who should not. If an administrative law judge systematically awards ben-
efits to more or fewer applicants than society would prefer, then there is a so-
cial cost. Bounded institutional structures can mitigate the costs of agent bias. 
Bounded institutional structures work best when the distribution of the 
subject population presented to the agent is relatively constant and large, the 
agent’s decisions are quantifiable, and the agent shares a rank ordering of sub-
jects with the principal. These conditions may be met in many judicial and 
quasi-judicial decision-making processes. Consider criminal sentencing. A 
judge makes sentencing decisions for a large number of offenders who are ran-
domly assigned to the judge. Some judges impose harsher sentences, while 
others are more lenient. Society demonstrates great concern about the possible 
biases of these judges.94 Indeed, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines attempt to 
reduce the scope of judicial discretion in sentencing95 by imposing intricate 
sentencing rules. The Guidelines continue to generate considerable controver-
sy.96 
 
94. See James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 275-77 (1999); Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge 
Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2010). 
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2012) (stating that the purpose of the Sentencing Commis-
sion is “avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records 
who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct”); U.S. SENTENCING  
COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 13 (2013), http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2013 
-ussc-guidelines-manual [http://perma.cc/E5UE-BQQV]; Anderson et al., supra note 94, at 
273. 
96. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal 
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 85 (2005) (“[T]he Federal Sentencing Guidelines have failed 
to reduce disparity and probably have increased it.”); Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315 (2005); Ow-
en S. Walker, Litigation-Enmeshed Sentencing: How the Guidelines Have Changed the Practice of 





A bounded sentencing structure offers an alternative means of constraining 
judicial bias without intruding into the judicial decision-making process. Each 
judge in a district97 could be given a “sentencing budget” that is determined by 
Congress.98 The budget could be specified for each offense type99 or for all of-
fenses put together and, if necessary, could span several years to minimize the 
problem of random variations in subject population. With a sentencing budget 
and random assignment of offenders to judges, each judge should have a rela-
tively similar population of offenders, particularly if the time frame is long 
enough to allow natural variation to balance out. Under these conditions, a 
bounded structure (a sentencing budget) reduces bias with little cost in rigidity 
so long as the judge shares a rank ordering of offense severity with society.100 
 
97. The budgets should be decided at the district level because this is the level at which defend-
ants are randomly assigned. Different districts have different populations of offenders and 
should therefore have different sentencing budgets that reflect the disparities. 
98. If the current sentencing schedule is viewed as appropriate on average but beset by excessive 
inter-judge disparities, then each judge in the district’s budget could be set to the average of 
the current sentence. 
99. The advantage of specifying the budget per offense type is that it reduces the possibility that 
sentencing will be misallocated due to uneven (though random) allocation of offense types 
across judges. The disadvantage of specifying the budget per offense type is that the number 
of offenders in each offense type will likely be smaller, raising the possibility of error. One 
possible solution is to specify the judge’s overall budget by offense type but allow the judge 
to allocate sentences across offense types. To illustrate, suppose that offense A has a budget 
of two years and offense B has a budget of three years. The average judge sentences the 
same number of offense A violators as offense B violators, meaning that the average sen-
tence per offender is 2.5 years. Over a given period, a particular judge sentences ten A of-
fenders and six B offenders. If the sentencing budget is set per judge with no revision for of-
fense type, then our judge will have a total of forty (16 times 2.5) years of sentences to assign 
to the sixteen offenders who need to be sentenced. If the sentencing budget is per offense 
type, then the judge will have a budget of twenty years to sentence the ten violators of A and 
eighteen with which to sentence the six violators of B. If the sentencing budget is allocated 
per sentence type but the judge can average across sentence types, then the judge will have a 
budget of thirty-eight years with which to sentence both the ten type A offenders and the six 
type B offenders. 
100. The assumption that judges share a rank ordering of offense severity with society is reason-
able but far from inevitable. As a member of society, the judge may have internalized many 
norms that are difficult to specify by guideline but are shared by most citizens. A judge who 
has internalized society’s norms will share society’s rank ordering. A given judge, however, 
may not share society’s rank ordering. A racist judge, for example, may deviate from socie-
ty’s ranking by imposing overly harsh sentences on offenders of a certain race. In these con-
ditions, the sentencing budget does not eliminate the problem of bias. So if the problem of 
sentencing disparities is due to excessive harshness or leniency on the part of judges, then a 
bounded sentencing budget will work well; if the problem is racism, however, then a 
bounded sentencing budget will not solve the problem unless the sentencing budget can be 
racially adjusted. In this case, the judge would receive a sentencing budget by race, limiting 
the judge’s ability to indulge her antisocial racial preference orderings. 
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In effect, society says, “We expect you to have to give out x years of sentences; 
you decide how to do it.” The “x years” criterion ensures that neither harsh 
judges nor lenient judges are able to impose their biased views upon the of-
fenders who happen to come before them. If the judges share society’s rank or-
dering of “to whom,” then a sentencing budget mitigates or even eliminates bi-
as without the intrusiveness of an intricate rule-based system, such as the sen-
sentencing guidelines. 
Bounded institutional structures are also promising in the context of judg-
ing immigration asylum cases. Congress wants some—but not all—foreigners 
residing in the United States to enjoy asylum (that is, those facing certain dan-
gers in their home countries). Congress’s perception of the desirability of asy-
lum likely depends on many hard-to-define factors, such as the presence of rea-
sonable fear of harm or the denial of important rights in the asylum seeker’s 
home country. Congress vests the power to grant asylum to both U.S. Citizen-
ship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) in the 
Department of Justice.101 These offices further specify standards and make de-
cisions, and asylum officers and immigration judges apply these standards.102 
This delegation policy introduces many problems. With such ambiguous 
standards, agents have the ability to indulge biases for or against asylum,103 to 
opine on issues on which the agents have little experience, or to adopt whimsi-
cal notions of how to apply the standards.104 
A bound on each judge who grants asylum would likely produce better out-
comes. For example, Congress could specify that a bounded number of people 
should receive asylum from each immigration judge each year (or provide a 
bound to asylums from an immigration judge over a multi-year period in order 
to raise the number of immigration applicants that each immigration judge 
sees when applying the bound). The bound on asylum numbers should miti-
 
101. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012). The USCIS initially handles “affirmative claims” for asylum. See 
Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Asylum Protection in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE 3 (Apr. 25, 2005). Agents can grant asylum after an interview, or, if asylum is not 
granted, refer the individual to an immigration judge of EOIR for a formal proceeding. Id. 
EOIR immigration judges also handle “defensive claims” of asylum during removal pro-
ceedings. Id. 
102. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2012). 
103. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 295, 302 (2007) (“[I]n the world of asylum adjudication, there is remarkable varia-
tion in decisionmaking from one official to the next, from one office to the next, from one 
region to the next, from one Court of Appeals to the next, and from one year to the next, 
even during periods when there has been no intervening change in the law.”). 
104. See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 833 (7th Cir. 2005) (calling the rationale of 





gate immigration judges’ biases and restrict judges’ ability to apply whimsical 
criteria. Biases will be directly reduced by the bound. If a particular immigra-
tion judge is systematically biased against asylum seekers relative to Congress, 
then Congress’s bound will force the judge to grant more asylums than she 
otherwise would. If another immigration judge is biased in favor of asylum, 
then the specified bound will restrict the number of applicants to whom the 
judge can grant asylum. The bound may also discourage immigration judges 
from indulging whimsical notions of eligibility. If the whimsical notion keeps a 
deserving applicant out, it also means that a less deserving applicant gets in. 
And so a biased immigration judge will be less likely to indulge her biases in an 
idiosyncratic way because the idiosyncrasy does not facilitate the bias—for ex-
ample, fewer asylum recipients—but rather allocates the benefit in a way the 
judge does not want—for example, she grants asylum to less deserving appli-
cants. 
This is not to say that a bound works perfectly. The number of people 
whom Congress would deem worthy of asylum may fluctuate unpredictably 
from year to year, and setting a precise number of asylum recipients does not 
allow the agents to adjust to the fluctuation. If Congress could express its asy-
lum preferences perfectly via an enforceable rule, then the rule would be pref-
erable, since it would ensure that the right applicants receive asylum without 
imposing a constraint on the number. But a rule is almost certainly infeasible 
in this case. And so Congress should weigh the bias reduction and thought 
clarification benefits of a bound (combined with a standard) against the cost of 
the rigidity the bound imposes. Congress may well decide that the benefits of 
the bound combined with the standard exceed the costs. 
Indeed, bounded institutional structures can ameliorate agent bias in al-
most every context in which agent bias is a problem. We can imagine “stop, 
question, and frisk” budgets assigned to the police to bound their ability to en-
gage in aggressive forms of policing; “summary judgment budgets” to stand-
ardize the difficult-to-police burden of “summary judgment”; “tort budgets” to 
reign in judges or districts that are perceived as too plaintiff-friendly or de-
fendant-friendly; “discrimination budgets” to address disparities in judges’ 
propensities to allow employment discrimination suits; sentencing budgets for 
prosecuting attorneys’ offices to mitigate the problem of prosecutorial over-
reach or under-reach; and patent budgets to ensure that the Patent and 
Trademark Office or individual patent examiners do not award patents to in-
novations that are insufficiently novel (or fail to grant patents to original prod-
ucts).105 
 
105. See generally Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 479 (2011) (discussing the 
PTO’s failings generally). 
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In all of these cases, and many others that have not been identified, the 
bounded institutional structure—some form of hard budget constraint—offers 
bias reduction at the cost of rigidity. Whether this trade-off is justified depends 
on the institutional setting. When more factors favoring bounds are present, 
the setting is more conducive to the use of budgets. 
One particularly important factor in all of these contexts is the quantifiabil-
ity and non-manipulability of the item subject to the budget. For example, if 
“stop, question, and frisk” is ambiguously defined, then the ability to bound 
the agent’s behavior is limited.106 Agents can manipulate the ambiguity in the 
definition to avoid the bias-ameliorating features of the bounded constraint. 
Thus, the ability to quantify—and the difficulty of manipulating—the bounded 
constraint is worth reemphasizing. 
E. Timing 
When grading, a professor sees the quality of the entire group of students 
at one time. In the examples mentioned above, the agent evaluates the subjects 
over time.107 This may lead to some complications. For example, early within a 
sentencing budget period, a judge or prosecutor may be excessively cautious, 
preserving too much of the budget for egregious future criminals who never 
appear.108 Alternatively, a judge may find that she has allocated too much of 
her sentencing budget to her early offenders, meaning that there is little left in 
the “budget” for heinous offenders. 
Several considerations suggest that though the timing problem is real, it 
should not necessarily prevent policymakers from imposing bounded institu-
tional constraints. First, any budget has a timing problem. When Congress al-
locates money for a purpose, the recipients of the money must ensure that the 
funds last the full year. With practice and careful observation, agents can be 
 
106. While “stop, question, and frisk” seems like it would be subject to greater ambiguity than 
other examples discussed here, the practice is sufficiently definable and quantifiable that it is 
possible to collect data on the subject. This data has been used to critique the police depart-
ments that use the tactic. See Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the 
New York City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bi-
as, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813 (2007). 
107. I thank Sarah Light for pointing out this concern. 
108. For an analysis of the allocation of a given budget to subjects that arrive over time, see Yair 
Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcies, 98 NW. U. 





taught to use the budget appropriately.109 Second, there may be ways to adjust 
the treatment of the early arrivals ex post to ensure equal treatment with late 
arrivals. For example, if a judge finds that she has been too strict with her early 
offenders, she can be allowed to cut some of the sentences she has already met-
ed out to ensure an adequate budget for the remainder of the period. 
Third, and most importantly, the potential costs of the timing problem for 
bounded constraints can be mitigated by using bounded intervals rather than 
exact numerical bounds. Judges, for example, can be given a sentencing budget 
interval rather than a precise sentencing number. In our example from the pre-
vious section, the judge may be granted a sentencing budget of between thirty-
five and forty-five months rather than a hard bound of forty months. The in-
terval allows for some slack in the budget, mitigating the harm caused by over- 
or under-aggressive use of the budget on early arrivals relative to late arrivals. 
Of course, the interval also partially undermines the purpose of the bounded 
constraint, because the interval allows some scope for biases to be realized. 
Nevertheless, a bounded interval combines some of the benefits of bounded 
constraints—preventing the realization of systematic bias that is greater than 
the size of the interval—while mitigating some of the bounded constraint’s 
most significant costs. 
conclusion 
Bounded institutional structures provide legislatures with a useful tool for 
delegating authority to agents, such as administrative agencies or courts. This 
Essay has established circumstances under which bounds are most effective—
when (1) agents are likely to be biased, (2) rules that constrain agent biases are 
impractical, (3) quality variation between subjects is limited, and (4) the num-
ber of subjects evaluated by each agent is large. 
In addition to this analysis of the optimal use of bounds, the Essay has a 
broader normative and methodological goal. While legislative delegation to 
agencies and courts is an exhaustively studied topic,110 scholarly writings suffer 
from insufficient attention to the economic literature on optimal delegation. 
The value of bounds (analyzed in a small and recent offshoot of this broader 
literature) is just one example of the many fruitful applications of the optimal 
delegation literature. 
 
109. This consideration favors a gradual, rather than abrupt, introduction of a bounded con-
straint where there has not been one previously. A gradual introduction allows learning that 
will prevent large-scale errors. 
110. For a review, see sources cited supra notes 1-3. 
  
the yale law journal 124:336   20 14  
388 
 
Bounds should be used more often. Under certain conditions—conditions 
that are not inevitable but also not implausible—bounds offer a compelling so-
lution to the problem of legislative delegation to agents. Bounds can allow leg-
islatures to take advantage of an agent’s expertise without allowing the agent to 
indulge biases. Bounds therefore ameliorate the tradeoff between expertise and 
bias that forms the core of many problems of institutional design.111 Additional 
scholarly attention to bounds may result in the identification of more situations 
in which this solution to the Gordian knot of institutional design is relevant. 
  
 
111. See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 
1596 (2012) (“Societies face trade-offs when designing each institution and even more trade-
offs when allocating decisions among institutions. The standard advice from theorists is to 
compare decision costs along with error costs across different institutional designs and insti-
tutional options. Some institutions will be frugal in churning out decisions, others expen-
sive; some will be reliably correct, others more error-prone. Such differences are partly a func-







Although the model presented here is similar to the one presented in Alex-
ander Frankel’s Aligned Delegation,112 there are at least two important differ-
ences. First, the Frankel model assumes that the principal wants to maximize 
the payout of the “worst-case scenario.” (Formally, the principal in the Frankel 
model has “maximum-minimum” preferences.113) Not surprisingly, Frankel’s 
strong assumption results in principals’ generally preferring bounds, which 
limit the severity of worst-case scenarios at the cost of imposing rigidity. In this 
model, by contrast, I assume that the principal cares about all scenarios and de-
signs limits to the agent’s behavior accordingly. Second, Frankel’s model does 
not consider the possibility that agents make mistakes. Instead, it assumes that 
agents observe subjects’ quality perfectly.114 In this model, by contrast, I allow 
for the possibility that agents make mistakes. 
A. Model Setup 
There is one principal, one agent, and a finite number of subjects (N). The 
principal wants to take allocation actions, denoted by 𝑎, that are a function of 
the “quality” of the subjects. The quality of subject 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 is denoted by 𝜃𝑖 . 
The principal cannot observe the subjects’ quality but knows the distribution 
of quality 𝑓(𝜃). Quality is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) The 
agent, by contrast, directly observes subject quality. (For much of what fol-
lows, I will assume that 𝜃~𝑈[0,1].) 
 
The principal’s utility is   𝑈!(𝑎, 𝜃) = −(𝑎! − 𝜃!)!!!!! .
115 
 
Agent A observes the subjects’ quality, 𝜃.116 The agent may be subject to bi-
as relative to the principal, however. Reflecting this possible bias, the agent’s 
utility is given by 𝑈!(𝑎, 𝜃) = −(𝑎! − 𝜃! − 𝜆)!!!!! , where λ reflects the 
agent’s bias. A greater λ corresponds to greater bias for the agent. For a subject 
with quality 𝜃!, the agent prefers the action 𝑎! = 𝜃! + 𝜆. 
 
112. See Frankel, supra note 7, at 68-72. 
113. Id. at 71. 
114. Id. at 69-70 (noting that the agent “privately observes” all of the information necessary for 
making policy allocations). 
115. Frankel calls these preferences “quadratic loss” utilities. Id. at 79. 
116. Below, I will consider how the analysis changes if the agent observes quality imperfectly. 
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If the principal imposes a bound or a budget, 𝐵, on the agent, then the 
agent must choose 𝑎!  such that 𝑎! = 𝐵!!!! . If there is no bound, then the 
agent chooses actions 𝑎!  freely. For simplicity, I assume that the bound is 
based on the mean value for each subject, 𝜇, and the number of subjects, 𝑁. 
Thus 𝐵 = 𝜇𝑁.  
The principal chooses whether to impose a bound based on whether the 


















subject to (if the principal imposes a bound) 𝑎! = 𝐵!!!! . 
B. Unbiased Agents 
Suppose that 𝜆 = 0. That is, agents are unbiased. If this is the case, then, 









The agent sets 𝑎! = 𝜃!  for all 𝑖. This means that the principal’s utility, 𝑈!, 
is zero (its highest value) because the agent, who has no bias, makes the policy 
allocation that the principal would make. The principal therefore cannot do 
better by imposing a bound. 
To see that the principal can do worse by imposing a bound, note that, if 









subject to the constraint 𝑎! = 𝐵!!!! = 𝜇𝑁 . 
Maximizing this with respect to 𝑎!  yields the first-order condition: 
−2 𝑎! − 𝜃! − 𝛿 = 0, where 𝛿 is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. 
Unless the Lagrange multiplier is zero, which could only occur if 𝜃! =!!!! 𝜇𝑁, 
an unlikely occurrence due to sampling variance in the subject population, then 
this equation implies that 𝑎! ≠ 𝜃!. Thus, the principal cannot get the best out-
come if the bound is binding, implying that the bound is inferior to an un-





C. Biased Agents 
Without a bound, a biased agent, 𝜆 ≠ 0, solves 
max!!   𝑈! 𝑎, 𝜃 = − 𝑎! − 𝜃! − 𝜆
!!
!!!  . 
The first-order condition for the agent’s solution is −2 𝑎! − 𝜃! − 𝜆 = 0 , 
which means that 𝑎! = 𝜃! + 𝜆.  
The principal’s utility when the agent is unbounded is therefore  
 
  𝑈! 𝑎, 𝜃 = − 𝜃! − 𝜃! + 𝜆 ! = −𝜆!𝑁!!!!  [Equation 1]. 
 
When the principal imposes a bound on the agent, such that 𝐵 = 𝜇𝑁, the 















Maximizing this with respect to 𝑎!  yields the first-order condition: 
−2 𝑎! − 𝜃! − 𝜆 − 𝛿𝜇𝑁 = 0 (for all 𝑖). Rearranging yields 
!! !!!!!!!
!"
= 𝛿 for 
all 𝑖 (and j) [Equation 2]. 
The first-order condition with respect to 𝛿 is 𝑎! =!!!! 𝜇𝑁 [Equation 3]. 
1. Bounds Remove Bias 
 With a bound, the agent’s actions no longer depend on the agent’s bias, 𝜆. 
To see this, solve for the agent’s allocation to any two subjects, 𝑎!  and 𝑎!!!. 
Using Equation 2 to relate 𝑎!  and 𝑎!  yields  
 
𝑎! = 𝑎! + (𝜃! − 𝜃!) [Equation 4] 
 
Thus, the agent’s actions depend only on the relative values of the subjects’ 
quality and are not a function of the agent’s bias, 𝜆. The agent’s actions are a 
function of the bound 𝑎! =!!!! 𝜇𝑁. If the bound is set too high, then the 
agent will over-allocate. If the bound is set too low, then the agent will under-
allocate. 
  
the yale law journal 124:336   20 14  
392 
 
2. Solving for the Agent’s Policy Allocation 
Use Equation 4 to solve for all 𝑎!  for 𝑗 = 2, 3, . . . ,𝑁 in terms of 𝑎! (without 
loss of generality) and plugging these solutions into Equation 3 yields: 
 
𝑎! = 𝑎! + 𝑎! + 𝜃! − 𝜃! + 𝑎! + 𝜃! − 𝜃!
!
!!!
+  . . .+𝑎! + 𝜃! − 𝜃! = 𝜇𝑁 
 
Rearranging: 𝑁𝑎! + 𝜃!!!!! − 𝑁 − 1 𝜃! = 𝑁𝑎! + 𝜃!!!!! − 𝑁𝜃! = 𝜇𝑁 
 
Solving for 𝑎!  yields 𝑎! = 𝜇 −
!!!!!!
!
+ 𝜃! [Equation 5] 
 
In words, the agent’s choice of action for any given subject depends on the 
relation of the mean of all subjects observed by the agent to the population 
mean and on the agent’s observation of that subject’s quality. If the average 
quality within the agent’s sample quality is below (above) the average popula-
tion quality, then the agent inflates (deflates) the allocation to the subject in 
order to comply with the bound. 
3. Comparing Bounds with No Bounds 
Plugging Equation 5 into the principal’s utility function yields 
 
  𝑈! 𝑎, 𝜃 = − 𝜇 −
!!!!!!
!
+ 𝜃! − 𝜃!
!
!
!!!  [Equation 6] 
 
In choosing whether to impose a bounded allocation, the principal com-
pares the expected values when the agent is 
ed,  𝑈! 𝑎, 𝜃 = − 𝜃! − 𝜃! + 𝜆 ! = −𝜆!𝑁!!!!  (Equation 1), with expected 
utility when the agent is bounded. 
4. Conditions Favoring Bounds 
The following conditions increase the relative desirability of bounds: 
1. More biased agents. The higher the agent’s bias, 𝜆, the lower the princi-
pal’s utility from an unbounded structure. See Equation 1. As a result, 
the principal prefers to impose a bound, all things equal, when the 
agent is more biased. 
 
2. Less variable subject quality. By the central limit theorem, as 𝑁 increases, 















. For a given number of observations, 
𝑁, the lower the variability in quality from subject to subject,  𝜎, the 
closer the sample mean, 
!!!!!!
!
, will be to the population mean,  𝜇. 
Equation 6 shows that for a bounded institutional structure, the nearer 
the sample mean is to the population mean, the higher the principal’s 
utility. Since, for any particular number of observations, the sample 
mean is closer to the population mean when subject variability is lower, 
a bounded allocation becomes more desirable. 
 
3. More subjects per agent. By the central limit theorem, the sample mean 
converges to the population mean. As the number of subjects, 𝑁, grows 
larger, the sample mean of subject quality, 
!!!!!!
!
, grows arbitrarily 




goes to zero as N gets very large. From Equation 6, the principal ob-
tains the highest possible utility when the sample mean equals the 
population mean, which allows the agent to make each policy allocation 
equal to the subject’s quality—exactly as the principal would like.  
5. Ideal Outcomes with Uninformed Principals, Biased Agents, and Many 
Subjects 
We have already established that with a bound, the agent’s allocation does 
not reflect the agent’s bias. For the principal’s ideal outcome to be achieved, the 
agent must choose an allocation, 𝑎! , equal to each subject’s quality, 𝜃!. By the 
central limit theorem, 
!!!!!!
!
~𝜇, as 𝑁 gets large. From Equation 5, this means 
that 𝑎! = 𝜃!, producing the ideal outcome.  
D. Error-Prone Agent Without Bias 
Assume, as before, that 𝑎! = 𝜃! + 𝜆, but alter the interpretation of 𝜆. Let 𝜆 
be a mean zero random variable with positive variance. This means that, ex 
ante, the agent does not have a bias in the sense that the agent’s average action 
without a bound will be the same as the principal’s. The agent, however, makes 
perfectly correlated systematic errors. That is, the agent makes the same mis-
take every time it takes an action. Once an agent over-allocates to one subject, 
for example, the agent over-allocates to every subject. From an ex post perspec-
tive, this phenomenon functions just like bias. The unbounded agent makes 
mistake after mistake from the principal’s perspective. 
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Under these circumstances, the results of the previous section apply. A 
bounded institutional structure reduces the cost of the agent’s systematic mis-
takes but introduces rigidity into the agent’s allocation procedure. The princi-
pal will prefer to introduce a bounded structure when the size of the systematic 
mistakes is larger, when the variation of subject quality is lower, and when an 
agent allocates to a larger number of subjects.  
E. Rules Versus Bounds 
Assume that there are now three possibilities for the principal. In addition 
to choosing a bounded versus an unbounded structure, the principal can man-
date that the agent follow a rule. Rules must be based on observable and verifi-
able characteristics of the subject. With a rule, the principal prescribes the allo-
cation, 𝑎!, to be given to a subject as a function of the subject’s observable 
characteristic, 𝜔!. Let there be some characteristic of each subject,  𝜔, that is ob-
servable and verifiable to the principal and to the agent but is imperfectly cor-
related with subject quality: 𝜔! = 𝜃! + 𝜖. Where the principal does not know 
𝜖, a simple rule for the principal to assign, given the principal’s utility function 
  𝑈! 𝑎, 𝜃 , would be 𝑎! = 𝜔!. 
𝜖 can be interpreted as a measure of the accuracy of the rule. If 𝜖 = 0, then 
we have a perfect rule, in which the principal can specify the principal’s ideal 
action to the agent via the rule. When 𝜖 > 0, we have an imperfect rule. With 
imperfect rules, the principal forces the agent to rely on an incorrect proxy for 
quality in making allocation decisions. A simple rule for the principal to assign, 
for example, would be 𝑎! = 𝜔!. 
If the principal imposes the rule 𝑎! = 𝜔!  on an agent, then the principal’s 
losses are  





If the principal imposes neither a rule nor a bound, then the principal’s 
utility (Equation 1) is  





And if the principal assigns a bound to the agent, the principal’s utility 
(Equation 6) is 
  𝑈! 𝑎, 𝜃 = − 𝜇 −
𝜃!!!!!
𝑁





If 𝜖! < 𝜆!, the principal prefers a rule to unbounded discretion. Compar-
ing the principal’s utility with the rule as opposed to a bound yields much the 





A bound is preferred to a rule, other things equal, when the following condi-
tions apply: 
 
1. Less accurate rules available to the principal. The greater the rule’s impreci-
sion, 𝜖, the lower the principal’s utility from a rule structure. As a re-
sult, the principal prefers a bound, all else equal, when the agent is 
more biased. 
 
2. Less variable subject quality. See the analysis in Appendix Part C.4 for a 
proof. 
 
3. More subjects per agent. See the analysis in Appendix Part C.4 for a proof. 
 
